| 1 | package acp |
| 2 | |
| 3 | import ( |
| 4 | "context" |
| 5 | "encoding/json" |
| 6 | "fmt" |
| 7 | "path/filepath" |
| 8 | "strconv" |
| 9 | "strings" |
| 10 | "sync" |
| 11 | "unicode/utf8" |
| 12 | |
| 13 | "reasonix/internal/agent" |
| 14 | "reasonix/internal/control" |
| 15 | "reasonix/internal/event" |
| 16 | "reasonix/internal/eventwire" |
| 17 | "reasonix/internal/permission" |
| 18 | "reasonix/internal/provider" |
| 19 | "reasonix/internal/shellparse" |
| 20 | "reasonix/internal/tool" |
| 21 | ) |
| 22 | |
| 23 | // notifier is the slice of Conn the dispatch sink depends on: it pushes |
| 24 | // session/update notifications and, when a tool needs approval, makes a |
| 25 | // session/request_permission request. Narrowing to this interface keeps the sink |
| 26 | // unit-testable with a fake. |
| 27 | type notifier interface { |
| 28 | Notify(method string, params any) error |
| 29 | Request(ctx context.Context, method string, params any) (json.RawMessage, error) |
| 30 | } |
| 31 | |
| 32 | // maxResultChars clips a tool result before it crosses the wire, matching main's |
| 33 | // dispatch.ts (the full result still goes to the model; this is display only). |
| 34 | const maxResultChars = 8000 |
| 35 | |
| 36 | // updateSink is an event.Sink bound to one session that maps the agent's typed |
| 37 | // event stream onto ACP session/update notifications. It is the v2 counterpart of |
| 38 | // main's dispatchKernelEvent: where main translated kernel events, we translate |
| 39 | // the event.Event the v2 agent already emits. |
| 40 | // |
| 41 | // v2 has no separate "tool intent" event — a call goes ToolDispatch → ToolResult, |
| 42 | // two states — so we emit a single pending tool_call on dispatch (already carrying |
| 43 | // rawInput, which main only had by the intent step) and a completed/failed |
| 44 | // tool_call_update on result. Message/Usage/Phase/TurnStarted/TurnDone have no |
| 45 | // place in main's update set and are dropped (TurnDone's outcome surfaces as the |
| 46 | // session/prompt stopReason instead). |
| 47 | // |
| 48 | // An ApprovalRequest is the controller asking the user to allow a gated tool |
| 49 | // call; the sink forwards it as a session/request_permission round-trip and feeds |
| 50 | // the answer back via approve (control.Controller.Approve), which the run loop is |
| 51 | // blocked on. |
| 52 | type updateSink struct { |
| 53 | conn notifier |
| 54 | sessionID string |
| 55 | // cwd resolves relative tool-arg paths for tool_call locations. Set once |
| 56 | // via bindCwd before the sink receives events. |
| 57 | cwd string |
| 58 | approve func(id string, allow, session, persist bool) |
| 59 | answer func(id string, answers []event.AskAnswer) |
| 60 | mcpInteractionSupported bool |
| 61 | answerMCPInteraction func(string, string, map[string]any) error |
| 62 | status func(event.Event) |
| 63 | // extensionSurface records the client's negotiated |
| 64 | // reasonix.extensionSurface support: structured surfaces go out as vendor |
| 65 | // session/update payloads on top of the always-sent text fallback. |
| 66 | extensionSurface bool |
| 67 | // speculativeToolIDs tracks parent-sampling tool IDs published under the |
| 68 | // active stream_attempt (attempt-scoped partials only). Guarded by mu — |
| 69 | // parent sampling and background sub-agents may Emit concurrently. |
| 70 | speculativeToolIDs map[string]struct{} |
| 71 | activeAttemptID string |
| 72 | mu sync.Mutex |
| 73 | turnCtx context.Context |
| 74 | } |
| 75 | |
| 76 | func newUpdateSink(conn notifier, sessionID string) *updateSink { |
| 77 | return &updateSink{conn: conn, sessionID: sessionID} |
| 78 | } |
| 79 | |
| 80 | // bindCwd installs the session root used to absolutize tool_call locations. |
| 81 | func (s *updateSink) bindCwd(cwd string) { s.cwd = cwd } |
| 82 | |
| 83 | // bindApprove installs the controller's Approve callback, called by the service |
| 84 | // once the controller exists (the sink is built first, to hand to the Factory). |
| 85 | func (s *updateSink) bindApprove(fn func(id string, allow, session, persist bool)) { |
| 86 | if fn == nil { |
| 87 | s.approve = nil |
| 88 | return |
| 89 | } |
| 90 | s.approve = fn |
| 91 | } |
| 92 | |
| 93 | // bindAnswer installs the controller's AnswerQuestion callback for AskRequest |
| 94 | // events. |
| 95 | func (s *updateSink) bindAnswer(fn func(id string, answers []event.AskAnswer)) { |
| 96 | s.answer = fn |
| 97 | } |
| 98 | |
| 99 | // bindStatus installs the vendor-status observer. It receives typed events, |
| 100 | // never raw reasoning text or terminal transcripts. |
| 101 | func (s *updateSink) bindStatus(fn func(event.Event)) { s.status = fn } |
| 102 | |
| 103 | // bindExtensionSurface records whether the client negotiated structured |
| 104 | // extension-surface support in the initialize handshake. |
| 105 | func (s *updateSink) bindExtensionSurface(supported bool) { s.extensionSurface = supported } |
| 106 | |
| 107 | func (s *updateSink) setTurnContext(ctx context.Context) { |
| 108 | s.mu.Lock() |
| 109 | s.turnCtx = ctx |
| 110 | s.mu.Unlock() |
| 111 | } |
| 112 | |
| 113 | func (s *updateSink) clearTurnContext() { |
| 114 | s.mu.Lock() |
| 115 | s.turnCtx = nil |
| 116 | s.mu.Unlock() |
| 117 | } |
| 118 | |
| 119 | func (s *updateSink) currentTurnContext() context.Context { |
| 120 | s.mu.Lock() |
| 121 | ctx := s.turnCtx |
| 122 | s.mu.Unlock() |
| 123 | if ctx == nil { |
| 124 | return context.Background() |
| 125 | } |
| 126 | return ctx |
| 127 | } |
| 128 | |
| 129 | // Emit implements event.Sink. The agent calls it serially (see event.Sink), so no |
| 130 | // locking is needed; write serialization lives in Conn. |
| 131 | func (s *updateSink) Emit(e event.Event) { |
| 132 | if s.status != nil { |
| 133 | s.status(e) |
| 134 | } |
| 135 | switch e.Kind { |
| 136 | case event.Reasoning: |
| 137 | if e.Text == "" { |
| 138 | return |
| 139 | } |
| 140 | s.send(messageChunk{SessionUpdate: "agent_thought_chunk", Content: textBlock(e.Text)}) |
| 141 | |
| 142 | case event.Text: |
| 143 | if e.Text == "" { |
| 144 | return |
| 145 | } |
| 146 | s.send(messageChunk{SessionUpdate: "agent_message_chunk", Content: textBlock(e.Text)}) |
| 147 | |
| 148 | case event.StreamAttempt: |
| 149 | // Attempt bookkeeping only. ACP still skips partial ToolDispatch (no |
| 150 | // pending card until full args arrive after commit), so discard must not |
| 151 | // invent failures for unpublished IDs. Full dispatches and parentId |
| 152 | // nested tools are real work and are never speculative. |
| 153 | s.mu.Lock() |
| 154 | switch e.StreamAttempt.Action { |
| 155 | case event.StreamAttemptBegin: |
| 156 | s.activeAttemptID = e.StreamAttempt.ID |
| 157 | s.speculativeToolIDs = nil |
| 158 | case event.StreamAttemptCommit, event.StreamAttemptDiscard: |
| 159 | s.activeAttemptID = "" |
| 160 | s.speculativeToolIDs = nil |
| 161 | } |
| 162 | s.mu.Unlock() |
| 163 | |
| 164 | case event.ToolDispatch: |
| 165 | // Skip the early (Partial) dispatch and later same-ID preview refresh: ACP |
| 166 | // expects one pending tool_call and has no file-diff update payload. |
| 167 | if e.Tool.Partial || e.Tool.Refreshed { |
| 168 | return |
| 169 | } |
| 170 | // Full dispatches only arrive after a committed sampling attempt (or from |
| 171 | // nested sub-agents). Never mark them speculative. A dispatch is still |
| 172 | // intent, so it cannot update the current todo projection. |
| 173 | s.send(toolCall{ |
| 174 | SessionUpdate: "tool_call", |
| 175 | ToolCallID: e.Tool.ID, |
| 176 | Title: e.Tool.Name, |
| 177 | Kind: toolKindFor(e.Tool.Name), |
| 178 | Status: "pending", |
| 179 | RawInput: rawJSON(e.Tool.Args), |
| 180 | Locations: s.toolLocations(e.Tool.Name, e.Tool.Args), |
| 181 | }) |
| 182 | |
| 183 | case event.ToolResult: |
| 184 | if e.Tool.TodoWritten { |
| 185 | s.send(planUpdate{SessionUpdate: "plan", Entries: planEntriesFromTodos(e.Tool.Todos)}) |
| 186 | } |
| 187 | status := "completed" |
| 188 | text := e.Tool.Output |
| 189 | if e.Tool.Err != "" { |
| 190 | status = "failed" |
| 191 | text = e.Tool.Err |
| 192 | } |
| 193 | if e.Tool.ID != "" { |
| 194 | s.mu.Lock() |
| 195 | delete(s.speculativeToolIDs, e.Tool.ID) |
| 196 | s.mu.Unlock() |
| 197 | } |
| 198 | s.send(toolCallUpdateMsg{ |
| 199 | SessionUpdate: "tool_call_update", |
| 200 | ToolCallID: e.Tool.ID, |
| 201 | Status: status, |
| 202 | Content: []toolContent{{Type: "content", Content: textBlock(clip(text))}}, |
| 203 | }) |
| 204 | |
| 205 | case event.Notice: |
| 206 | // Surface warnings to the host as a message chunk so they're not lost; |
| 207 | // generic info-level notices stay out of band. Completion uncertainty is |
| 208 | // a recoverable terminal result and is shown without warning severity. |
| 209 | if e.Level == event.LevelWarn && e.Text != "" { |
| 210 | s.send(messageChunk{ |
| 211 | SessionUpdate: "agent_message_chunk", |
| 212 | Content: textBlock("\n\n[warning] " + e.Text), |
| 213 | }) |
| 214 | } else if e.Code == event.NoticeCodeCompletionUncertain && e.Text != "" { |
| 215 | s.send(messageChunk{ |
| 216 | SessionUpdate: "agent_message_chunk", |
| 217 | Content: textBlock("\n\n" + e.Text), |
| 218 | }) |
| 219 | } |
| 220 | |
| 221 | case event.CompactionDone: |
| 222 | // ACP has no compaction-card concept; surface a one-line note so the host |
| 223 | // knows the context was summarized (an aborted pass has no summary). |
| 224 | if e.Compaction.Summary != "" { |
| 225 | s.send(messageChunk{ |
| 226 | SessionUpdate: "agent_message_chunk", |
| 227 | Content: textBlock(fmt.Sprintf("\n\n[compacted %d earlier messages to save context]", e.Compaction.Messages)), |
| 228 | }) |
| 229 | } |
| 230 | |
| 231 | case event.ApprovalRequest, event.AskRequest, event.MCPInteractionRequest: |
| 232 | s.emitPrompt(e) |
| 233 | |
| 234 | case event.ExtensionSurface, event.ExtensionStatus: |
| 235 | s.emitExtension(e) |
| 236 | } |
| 237 | } |
| 238 | |
| 239 | // emitExtension maps one extension structured-UI event onto ACP updates. A |
| 240 | // client that negotiated reasonix.extensionSurface receives the structured DTO |
| 241 | // (the shared eventwire JSON contract) in a vendor session/update variant; |
| 242 | // every client — including that one, belt and suspenders — also receives the |
| 243 | // flattened text fallback as an ordinary agent_message_chunk. Blocking |
| 244 | // form/request prompts never arrive here: the hub routes those through |
| 245 | // AskRequest, which already rides the session/request_permission round-trip. |
| 246 | func (s *updateSink) emitExtension(e event.Event) { |
| 247 | p := e.Extension |
| 248 | if p == nil { |
| 249 | return |
| 250 | } |
| 251 | if s.extensionSurface { |
| 252 | if dto := eventwire.ToWireExtensionSurface(p); dto != nil { |
| 253 | s.send(extensionSurfaceUpdate{ |
| 254 | SessionUpdate: extensionSurfaceUpdateKind, |
| 255 | Meta: map[string]any{ |
| 256 | "reasonix.io": map[string]any{ |
| 257 | "extensionSurface": dto, |
| 258 | }, |
| 259 | }, |
| 260 | }) |
| 261 | } |
| 262 | } |
| 263 | text := extensionSurfaceText(p) |
| 264 | if text == "" { |
| 265 | return |
| 266 | } |
| 267 | prefix := "\n\n" |
| 268 | if extensionSeverityWarns(p) { |
| 269 | prefix += "[warning] " |
| 270 | } |
| 271 | s.send(messageChunk{SessionUpdate: "agent_message_chunk", Content: textBlock(prefix + text)}) |
| 272 | } |
| 273 | |
| 274 | // extensionSurfaceText flattens one extension surface payload to plain text |
| 275 | // for clients without structured-surface support: status → |
| 276 | // "[plugin] label: detail", card → title + body + fields, form → title + |
| 277 | // message, notification → title + body. |
| 278 | func extensionSurfaceText(p *event.ExtensionSurfacePayload) string { |
| 279 | var b strings.Builder |
| 280 | write := func(s string) { |
| 281 | if s == "" { |
| 282 | return |
| 283 | } |
| 284 | if b.Len() > 0 { |
| 285 | b.WriteString("\n") |
| 286 | } |
| 287 | b.WriteString(s) |
| 288 | } |
| 289 | switch { |
| 290 | case p.Status != nil: |
| 291 | line := "[" + p.PluginID + "] " + p.Status.Label |
| 292 | if p.Status.Detail != "" { |
| 293 | line += ": " + p.Status.Detail |
| 294 | } |
| 295 | write(line) |
| 296 | case p.Card != nil: |
| 297 | write(p.Card.Title) |
| 298 | body := p.Card.Text |
| 299 | if p.Card.Markdown != "" { |
| 300 | body = p.Card.Markdown |
| 301 | } |
| 302 | write(body) |
| 303 | for _, f := range p.Card.Fields { |
| 304 | write(f.Key + ": " + f.Value) |
| 305 | } |
| 306 | case p.Form != nil: |
| 307 | write(p.Form.Title) |
| 308 | write(p.Form.Message) |
| 309 | case p.Notification != nil: |
| 310 | write(p.Notification.Title) |
| 311 | write(p.Notification.Body) |
| 312 | } |
| 313 | return b.String() |
| 314 | } |
| 315 | |
| 316 | // extensionSeverityWarns reports whether the payload carries a warn/error |
| 317 | // severity, which earns the same "[warning] " prefix as event.Notice. |
| 318 | func extensionSeverityWarns(p *event.ExtensionSurfacePayload) bool { |
| 319 | severity := "" |
| 320 | if p.Status != nil { |
| 321 | severity = p.Status.Severity |
| 322 | } |
| 323 | if p.Notification != nil { |
| 324 | severity = p.Notification.Severity |
| 325 | } |
| 326 | return severity == "warn" || severity == "error" |
| 327 | } |
| 328 | |
| 329 | func (s *updateSink) send(update any) { |
| 330 | _ = s.conn.Notify("session/update", SessionUpdateParams{SessionID: s.sessionID, Update: update}) |
| 331 | } |
| 332 | |
| 333 | // replay streams a loaded conversation back to the client as session/update |
| 334 | // notifications so a resumed session reconstructs its transcript view. The |
| 335 | // system message is skipped (not user-visible); everything is reported as already |
| 336 | // completed since it is history, not a live turn. |
| 337 | func (s *updateSink) replay(msgs []provider.Message) { |
| 338 | for _, m := range msgs { |
| 339 | if agent.IsPinnedContextRevision(m) { |
| 340 | continue |
| 341 | } |
| 342 | switch m.Role { |
| 343 | case provider.RoleUser: |
| 344 | // Replay the user-authored view, not the persisted wire form: |
| 345 | // UserMessageText strips injected transient blocks (<response-language> |
| 346 | // etc.) and unwraps memory-compiler contracts, same as every other |
| 347 | // surface (#6882). A turn that was pure injection replays as nothing. |
| 348 | text := m.Content |
| 349 | if steer, ok := agent.SteerText(text); ok { |
| 350 | text = steer |
| 351 | } else { |
| 352 | text = agent.UserMessageText(m) |
| 353 | } |
| 354 | if text != "" { |
| 355 | s.send(messageChunk{SessionUpdate: "user_message_chunk", Content: textBlock(text)}) |
| 356 | } |
| 357 | case provider.RoleAssistant: |
| 358 | if m.ReasoningContent != "" { |
| 359 | s.send(messageChunk{SessionUpdate: "agent_thought_chunk", Content: textBlock(m.ReasoningContent)}) |
| 360 | } |
| 361 | // Same display filter as live emission: goal markers and evidence |
| 362 | // blocks stay in history for parsing but never reach the client. |
| 363 | if display := agent.DisplayAssistantText(m.Content); display != "" { |
| 364 | s.send(messageChunk{SessionUpdate: "agent_message_chunk", Content: textBlock(display)}) |
| 365 | } |
| 366 | for _, tc := range m.ToolCalls { |
| 367 | s.send(toolCall{ |
| 368 | SessionUpdate: "tool_call", |
| 369 | ToolCallID: tc.ID, |
| 370 | Title: tc.Name, |
| 371 | Kind: toolKindFor(tc.Name), |
| 372 | Status: "completed", |
| 373 | RawInput: rawJSON(tc.Arguments), |
| 374 | Locations: s.toolLocations(tc.Name, tc.Arguments), |
| 375 | }) |
| 376 | } |
| 377 | case provider.RoleTool: |
| 378 | s.send(toolCallUpdateMsg{ |
| 379 | SessionUpdate: "tool_call_update", |
| 380 | ToolCallID: m.ToolCallID, |
| 381 | Status: "completed", |
| 382 | Content: []toolContent{{Type: "content", Content: textBlock(clip(m.Content))}}, |
| 383 | }) |
| 384 | } |
| 385 | } |
| 386 | } |
| 387 | |
| 388 | // requestPermission forwards an approval request to the client as a |
| 389 | // session/request_permission round-trip and feeds the outcome back through |
| 390 | // approve. Any transport failure or a cancelled/rejected outcome denies the call, |
| 391 | // so the model gets a blocked result rather than the turn hanging. |
| 392 | func (s *updateSink) requestPermission(ctx context.Context, a event.Approval) { |
| 393 | if s.approve == nil { |
| 394 | return |
| 395 | } |
| 396 | title := a.Tool |
| 397 | if a.Subject != "" { |
| 398 | title = a.Tool + " " + a.Subject |
| 399 | } |
| 400 | options := approvalOptions(a.Tool, a.Subject, a.Fresh) |
| 401 | if a.Kind == event.ApprovalKindWriteAccess || a.WriteAccess != nil { |
| 402 | options = writeAccessApprovalOptions() |
| 403 | } |
| 404 | params := PermissionRequestParams{ |
| 405 | SessionID: s.sessionID, |
| 406 | ToolCall: PermissionToolCall{ |
| 407 | ToolCallID: "gate-" + a.ID, |
| 408 | Title: title, |
| 409 | Kind: toolKindFor(a.Tool), |
| 410 | Status: "pending", |
| 411 | RawInput: rawJSON(string(a.RawInput)), |
| 412 | Locations: s.toolLocations(a.Tool, string(a.RawInput)), |
| 413 | Meta: s.permissionMeta(a), |
| 414 | }, |
| 415 | Options: options, |
| 416 | } |
| 417 | |
| 418 | allow, session := false, false |
| 419 | if raw, err := s.conn.Request(ctx, "session/request_permission", params); err == nil { |
| 420 | var res PermissionRequestResult |
| 421 | if json.Unmarshal(raw, &res) == nil && res.Outcome.Outcome == "selected" { |
| 422 | switch res.Outcome.OptionID { |
| 423 | case "reasonix_write_once": |
| 424 | allow = true |
| 425 | case "reasonix_write_session": |
| 426 | allow, session = true, true |
| 427 | case "reasonix_write_deny": |
| 428 | case string(OptAllowOnce): |
| 429 | allow = true |
| 430 | case string(OptAllowAlways): |
| 431 | allow, session = true, true |
| 432 | } |
| 433 | } |
| 434 | } |
| 435 | s.approve(a.ID, allow, session, false) |
| 436 | } |
| 437 | |
| 438 | func writeAccessApprovalOptions() []PermissionOption { |
| 439 | return []PermissionOption{ |
| 440 | {OptionID: "reasonix_write_once", Name: "Allow once", Kind: OptAllowOnce}, |
| 441 | {OptionID: "reasonix_write_session", Name: "Allow these directories for this session", Kind: OptAllowAlways}, |
| 442 | {OptionID: "reasonix_write_deny", Name: "Reject", Kind: OptRejectOnce}, |
| 443 | } |
| 444 | } |
| 445 | |
| 446 | // permissionMeta carries Reasonix-owned structured data that an ACP supervisor |
| 447 | // may trust independently from model-supplied rawInput. A foreground bash call |
| 448 | // receives argv only when the command is a single static command: shell |
| 449 | // expansion, control operators, redirects, assignments, and background jobs are |
| 450 | // omitted from this advisory argv field; execution still follows the active |
| 451 | // permission preset and OS sandbox rather than the command's syntax shape. |
| 452 | func (s *updateSink) permissionMeta(a event.Approval) map[string]any { |
| 453 | reasonix := map[string]any{ |
| 454 | "approvalId": a.ID, |
| 455 | "tool": a.Tool, |
| 456 | "subject": a.Subject, |
| 457 | "fresh": a.Fresh, |
| 458 | } |
| 459 | if reason := strings.TrimSpace(a.Reason); reason != "" { |
| 460 | reasonix["reason"] = reason |
| 461 | } |
| 462 | if wa := a.WriteAccess; wa != nil { |
| 463 | reasonix["kind"] = event.ApprovalKindWriteAccess |
| 464 | reasonix["directories"] = append([]string{}, wa.Directories...) |
| 465 | reasonix["displayDirectories"] = append([]string{}, wa.DisplayDirectories...) |
| 466 | reasonix["justification"] = wa.Justification |
| 467 | reasonix["broadHomeAccess"] = wa.BroadHomeAccess |
| 468 | reasonix["ordinaryPermissionNeeded"] = wa.OrdinaryPermissionNeeded |
| 469 | reasonix["persistAllowed"] = wa.PersistAllowed |
| 470 | } |
| 471 | if tool.IsShellToolName(a.Tool) && strings.TrimSpace(s.cwd) != "" { |
| 472 | var input struct { |
| 473 | Command string `json:"command"` |
| 474 | RunInBackground bool `json:"run_in_background"` |
| 475 | PreserveBackgroundProcesses bool `json:"preserve_background_processes"` |
| 476 | } |
| 477 | if json.Unmarshal(a.RawInput, &input) == nil && |
| 478 | !input.RunInBackground && !input.PreserveBackgroundProcesses { |
| 479 | cwd, cwdErr := filepath.Abs(s.cwd) |
| 480 | features, featureOK := shellparse.AnalyzeApprovalFeatures(input.Command) |
| 481 | command, commandErr := shellparse.ParseStaticCommand(input.Command, shellparse.StaticCommandPolicy{}) |
| 482 | exact := featureOK && !features.DynamicCommandName && !features.NestedExecution && |
| 483 | !features.Expansion && !features.Assignment && !features.Redirection && |
| 484 | !shellparse.ContainsUnquotedGlob(input.Command) |
| 485 | for _, arg := range command.Argv { |
| 486 | // Tilde expansion is shell-dependent and therefore not exact argv. |
| 487 | if strings.HasPrefix(arg, "~") { |
| 488 | exact = false |
| 489 | } |
| 490 | } |
| 491 | if cwdErr == nil && commandErr == nil && exact && len(command.Argv) > 0 { |
| 492 | reasonix["commandSchemaVersion"] = 1 |
| 493 | reasonix["argv"] = command.Argv |
| 494 | reasonix["cwd"] = cwd |
| 495 | } |
| 496 | } |
| 497 | } |
| 498 | return map[string]any{"reasonix.io": reasonix} |
| 499 | } |
| 500 | |
| 501 | func (s *updateSink) requestAsk(ctx context.Context, a event.Ask) { |
| 502 | if s.answer == nil { |
| 503 | return |
| 504 | } |
| 505 | answers := make([]event.AskAnswer, 0, len(a.Questions)) |
| 506 | for _, q := range a.Questions { |
| 507 | selected, ok := s.requestAskQuestion(ctx, a.ID, q) |
| 508 | if !ok { |
| 509 | s.answer(a.ID, nil) |
| 510 | return |
| 511 | } |
| 512 | answers = append(answers, event.AskAnswer{QuestionID: q.ID, Selected: []string{selected}}) |
| 513 | } |
| 514 | s.answer(a.ID, answers) |
| 515 | } |
| 516 | |
| 517 | func (s *updateSink) requestAskQuestion(ctx context.Context, askID string, q event.AskQuestion) (string, bool) { |
| 518 | title := strings.TrimSpace(q.Prompt) |
| 519 | if title == "" { |
| 520 | title = strings.TrimSpace(q.Header) |
| 521 | } |
| 522 | if title == "" { |
| 523 | title = "Question" |
| 524 | } |
| 525 | content := []toolContent(nil) |
| 526 | if q.Header != "" && q.Header != title { |
| 527 | content = append(content, toolContent{Type: "content", Content: textBlock(q.Header)}) |
| 528 | } |
| 529 | options := make([]PermissionOption, 0, len(q.Options)+1) |
| 530 | labelsByID := make(map[string]string, len(q.Options)) |
| 531 | for i, opt := range q.Options { |
| 532 | id := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", q.ID, i+1) |
| 533 | name := strings.TrimSpace(opt.Label) |
| 534 | if strings.TrimSpace(opt.Description) != "" { |
| 535 | name += " - " + strings.TrimSpace(opt.Description) |
| 536 | } |
| 537 | options = append(options, PermissionOption{OptionID: id, Name: name, Kind: OptAllowOnce}) |
| 538 | labelsByID[id] = opt.Label |
| 539 | } |
| 540 | options = append(options, PermissionOption{OptionID: q.ID + ":cancel", Name: "Cancel", Kind: OptRejectOnce}) |
| 541 | |
| 542 | rawInput, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{ |
| 543 | "id": q.ID, |
| 544 | "question": title, |
| 545 | "options": q.Options, |
| 546 | "multi": q.Multi, |
| 547 | }) |
| 548 | params := PermissionRequestParams{ |
| 549 | SessionID: s.sessionID, |
| 550 | ToolCall: PermissionToolCall{ |
| 551 | ToolCallID: "ask-" + askID + "-" + q.ID, |
| 552 | Title: title, |
| 553 | Kind: "other", |
| 554 | Status: "pending", |
| 555 | Content: content, |
| 556 | RawInput: rawInput, |
| 557 | }, |
| 558 | Options: options, |
| 559 | } |
| 560 | |
| 561 | raw, err := s.conn.Request(ctx, "session/request_permission", params) |
| 562 | if err != nil { |
| 563 | return "", false |
| 564 | } |
| 565 | var res PermissionRequestResult |
| 566 | if json.Unmarshal(raw, &res) != nil || res.Outcome.Outcome != "selected" { |
| 567 | return "", false |
| 568 | } |
| 569 | label, ok := labelsByID[res.Outcome.OptionID] |
| 570 | return label, ok |
| 571 | } |
| 572 | |
| 573 | func approvalSessionOptionName(tool, subject string) string { |
| 574 | if tool == control.SandboxEscapeApprovalTool { |
| 575 | return "Use real environment for this session" |
| 576 | } |
| 577 | sessionRule := permission.SessionGrantRuleForScope(tool, subject) |
| 578 | return "Allow " + sessionRule + " for this session" |
| 579 | } |
| 580 | |
| 581 | func approvalOptions(tool, subject string, fresh bool) []PermissionOption { |
| 582 | if fresh || control.RequiresFreshHumanApprovalTool(tool) { |
| 583 | if tool == control.SandboxEscapeApprovalTool { |
| 584 | return []PermissionOption{ |
| 585 | {OptionID: string(OptAllowOnce), Name: "Allow", Kind: OptAllowOnce}, |
| 586 | {OptionID: string(OptAllowAlways), Name: approvalSessionOptionName(tool, subject), Kind: OptAllowAlways}, |
| 587 | {OptionID: string(OptRejectOnce), Name: "Reject", Kind: OptRejectOnce}, |
| 588 | } |
| 589 | } |
| 590 | return []PermissionOption{ |
| 591 | {OptionID: string(OptAllowOnce), Name: "Allow", Kind: OptAllowOnce}, |
| 592 | {OptionID: string(OptRejectOnce), Name: "Reject", Kind: OptRejectOnce}, |
| 593 | } |
| 594 | } |
| 595 | allowSessionName := approvalSessionOptionName(tool, subject) |
| 596 | options := []PermissionOption{ |
| 597 | {OptionID: string(OptAllowOnce), Name: "Allow", Kind: OptAllowOnce}, |
| 598 | {OptionID: string(OptAllowAlways), Name: allowSessionName, Kind: OptAllowAlways}, |
| 599 | {OptionID: string(OptRejectOnce), Name: "Reject", Kind: OptRejectOnce}, |
| 600 | } |
| 601 | return options |
| 602 | } |
| 603 | |
| 604 | // textBlock builds a text content block. |
| 605 | func textBlock(text string) ContentBlock { return ContentBlock{Type: "text", Text: text} } |
| 606 | |
| 607 | // rawJSON returns args as a raw JSON value when it is valid JSON, else nil so the |
| 608 | // rawInput field is omitted rather than carrying a malformed payload. |
| 609 | func rawJSON(args string) json.RawMessage { |
| 610 | if args == "" || !json.Valid([]byte(args)) { |
| 611 | return nil |
| 612 | } |
| 613 | return json.RawMessage(args) |
| 614 | } |
| 615 | |
| 616 | // clip truncates text to maxResultChars, appending a note, matching dispatch.ts. |
| 617 | func clip(text string) string { |
| 618 | if len(text) <= maxResultChars { |
| 619 | return text |
| 620 | } |
| 621 | end := maxResultChars |
| 622 | for end > 0 && !utf8.ValidString(text[:end]) { |
| 623 | end-- |
| 624 | } |
| 625 | return text[:end] + "\n…(" + |
| 626 | strconv.Itoa(len(text)-end) + " more chars truncated)" |
| 627 | } |
| 628 | |
| 629 | // toolKindFor maps a tool name to the ACP tool kind the host uses to categorize |
| 630 | // the call in its UI. The kinds match main's restricted set |
| 631 | // (read/edit/search/execute/other). Known v2 built-ins map explicitly; anything |
| 632 | // else (plugins, the task tool) falls back to a name heuristic, then "other". |
| 633 | func toolKindFor(name string) string { |
| 634 | switch name { |
| 635 | case "read_file", "ls", "glob": |
| 636 | return "read" |
| 637 | case "grep": |
| 638 | return "search" |
| 639 | case "edit_file", "move_file", "multiedit", "write_file": |
| 640 | return "edit" |
| 641 | case "bash", "pwsh", "powershell", "shell": |
| 642 | return "execute" |
| 643 | case control.SandboxEscapeApprovalTool: |
| 644 | return "execute" |
| 645 | } |
| 646 | n := strings.ToLower(name) |
| 647 | switch { |
| 648 | case strings.Contains(n, "search") || strings.Contains(n, "grep") || strings.Contains(n, "find"): |
| 649 | return "search" |
| 650 | case strings.Contains(n, "edit") || strings.Contains(n, "write") || strings.Contains(n, "replace"): |
| 651 | return "edit" |
| 652 | case strings.Contains(n, "read") || strings.Contains(n, "cat") || strings.Contains(n, "view"): |
| 653 | return "read" |
| 654 | case strings.Contains(n, "bash") || strings.Contains(n, "exec") || strings.Contains(n, "shell") || strings.Contains(n, "run"): |
| 655 | return "execute" |
| 656 | default: |
| 657 | return "other" |
| 658 | } |
| 659 | } |
| 660 | |
| 661 | // locationTools names the builtin tools whose "path" argument is a real file |
| 662 | // target worth a follow-along location. Search/list tools are excluded: their |
| 663 | // path is a directory scope, not a file the user would want opened. |
| 664 | var locationTools = map[string]bool{ |
| 665 | "read_file": true, |
| 666 | "write_file": true, |
| 667 | "edit_file": true, |
| 668 | "multi_edit": true, |
| 669 | "notebook_edit": true, |
| 670 | "delete_range": true, |
| 671 | "delete_symbol": true, |
| 672 | "code_index": true, |
| 673 | } |
| 674 | |
| 675 | // toolLocations derives the file location a tool call touches from its raw |
| 676 | // args, so the client can follow along in the editor. Unknown tools and |
| 677 | // path-less args yield nil. |
| 678 | func (s *updateSink) toolLocations(name, rawArgs string) []ToolCallLocation { |
| 679 | if !locationTools[name] { |
| 680 | return nil |
| 681 | } |
| 682 | var p struct { |
| 683 | Path string `json:"path"` |
| 684 | Offset int `json:"offset"` |
| 685 | } |
| 686 | if json.Unmarshal([]byte(rawArgs), &p) != nil || strings.TrimSpace(p.Path) == "" { |
| 687 | return nil |
| 688 | } |
| 689 | loc := ToolCallLocation{Path: s.absPath(p.Path)} |
| 690 | // read_file's offset is a 0-based start line; surface it so the editor can |
| 691 | // jump to the region being read. |
| 692 | if name == "read_file" && p.Offset > 0 { |
| 693 | line := p.Offset + 1 |
| 694 | loc.Line = &line |
| 695 | } |
| 696 | return []ToolCallLocation{loc} |
| 697 | } |
| 698 | |
| 699 | func (s *updateSink) absPath(p string) string { |
| 700 | if filepath.IsAbs(p) || s.cwd == "" { |
| 701 | return p |
| 702 | } |
| 703 | return filepath.Join(s.cwd, p) |
| 704 | } |
| 705 | |
| 706 | // planEntriesFromTodos maps the committed host projection onto ACP's complete |
| 707 | // replacement plan. Empty input deliberately clears the client plan. |
| 708 | func planEntriesFromTodos(todos []event.Todo) []PlanEntry { |
| 709 | entries := make([]PlanEntry, 0, len(todos)) |
| 710 | for _, t := range todos { |
| 711 | if strings.TrimSpace(t.Content) == "" { |
| 712 | continue |
| 713 | } |
| 714 | status := t.Status |
| 715 | switch status { |
| 716 | case "pending", "in_progress", "completed": |
| 717 | default: |
| 718 | status = "pending" |
| 719 | } |
| 720 | entries = append(entries, PlanEntry{Content: t.Content, Priority: "medium", Status: status}) |
| 721 | } |
| 722 | return entries |
| 723 | } |
| 724 |