| 1 | package control |
| 2 | |
| 3 | import ( |
| 4 | "context" |
| 5 | "encoding/json" |
| 6 | "fmt" |
| 7 | "strconv" |
| 8 | "strings" |
| 9 | "sync" |
| 10 | "time" |
| 11 | |
| 12 | "reasonix/internal/event" |
| 13 | "reasonix/internal/i18n" |
| 14 | "reasonix/internal/permission" |
| 15 | ) |
| 16 | |
| 17 | // approvalManager owns the approval/ask prompt bookkeeping and the runtime |
| 18 | // approval posture, behind its own locks and off the controller's c.mu. It is a |
| 19 | // strict leaf: its methods only touch its own state and never call back into the |
| 20 | // Controller. The Controller keeps the I/O orchestration (emitting events, |
| 21 | // firing hooks, rebuilding the executor gate) that needs its other collaborators |
| 22 | // — approval, unlike the goal FSM, blocks on user input and has side effects, so |
| 23 | // only the bookkeeping is extracted, not the orchestration. |
| 24 | type approvalManager struct { |
| 25 | // policy is the immutable base permission policy, captured at construction. |
| 26 | // Used to decide whether a tool call would auto-approve under the writer |
| 27 | // fallback (autoApprovalWouldAllowLocked); the Controller keeps its own copy |
| 28 | // for building the executor gate. |
| 29 | policy permission.Policy |
| 30 | |
| 31 | // mu guards the prompt maps and posture fields; every critical section under |
| 32 | // it is short and non-blocking. |
| 33 | mu sync.Mutex |
| 34 | approvals map[string]pendingApproval |
| 35 | asks map[string]pendingAsk |
| 36 | granted map[string]bool |
| 37 | planModeReadOnlyCommands map[string]bool |
| 38 | nextID int |
| 39 | // toolApprovalMode is the runtime approval posture: "ask" prompts, "auto" |
| 40 | // lets the policy auto-approve the writer fallback while preserving ask/deny |
| 41 | // rules, and "yolo" skips ordinary tool prompts while deny rules and fresh |
| 42 | // decisions remain enforced. |
| 43 | toolApprovalMode string |
| 44 | // approvalTimeout bounds how long requestApproval/Ask block on a user |
| 45 | // decision. Zero means wait indefinitely (correct for an interactive |
| 46 | // terminal); bot/headless frontends set it so a walked-away user can't wedge |
| 47 | // the session forever (#4626, #4402). Write-once at construction. |
| 48 | approvalTimeout time.Duration |
| 49 | // planAutoApprove auto-allows the ordinary writer fallback while a |
| 50 | // just-approved plan executes. Explicit ask/deny rules and fresh decisions |
| 51 | // remain authoritative, matching Auto rather than YOLO semantics. |
| 52 | planAutoApprove bool |
| 53 | |
| 54 | // promptMu serializes outstanding prompts so at most one user decision is in |
| 55 | // flight. Held across the blocking wait, so it must never be taken by the |
| 56 | // resolve paths (Approve/AnswerQuestion). sink.Emit also runs under it (Ask, |
| 57 | // requestApproval): Sink implementations must not block and must not call |
| 58 | // back into Ask or the tool-approval chain, or they deadlock the prompt. |
| 59 | promptMu sync.Mutex |
| 60 | // promptEmitMu serializes prompt registration and emission with an SSE |
| 61 | // attach handoff. It is separate from promptMu because promptMu remains |
| 62 | // held while waiting for the user's answer. |
| 63 | promptEmitMu sync.Mutex |
| 64 | } |
| 65 | |
| 66 | func newApprovalManager(policy permission.Policy, mode string, timeout time.Duration) approvalManager { |
| 67 | return approvalManager{ |
| 68 | policy: policy, |
| 69 | approvals: map[string]pendingApproval{}, |
| 70 | asks: map[string]pendingAsk{}, |
| 71 | granted: map[string]bool{}, |
| 72 | planModeReadOnlyCommands: map[string]bool{}, |
| 73 | toolApprovalMode: mode, |
| 74 | approvalTimeout: timeout, |
| 75 | } |
| 76 | } |
| 77 | |
| 78 | // NewHeadlessPermissionGate builds the legacy bootstrap gate used before a |
| 79 | // frontend declares its approval posture. Interactive frontends replace it |
| 80 | // before running; callers that are actually headless must pass a non-empty mode |
| 81 | // through BuildHeadlessApprovalGate. |
| 82 | func NewHeadlessPermissionGate(policy permission.Policy) *freshHumanHeadlessGate { |
| 83 | return &freshHumanHeadlessGate{gate: permission.NewGate(policy, nil)} |
| 84 | } |
| 85 | |
| 86 | // BuildHeadlessApprovalGate constructs the non-interactive gate for a given |
| 87 | // approval mode, matching the contract ApplyHeadlessApprovalMode installs on a |
| 88 | // running controller's parent executor. boot uses this as the single |
| 89 | // construction point for every headless-only gate — the top-level executor, |
| 90 | // the `task`/`read_only_task` sub-agent, writer-capable skill sub-agents |
| 91 | // (run_skill/install_skill), and the planner runner — so all of them share the |
| 92 | // CLI-selected headless approval mode instead of only the parent executor |
| 93 | // getting it while the rest silently keep the mode-unaware default, which let |
| 94 | // a task sub-agent run a write an explicit ask |
| 95 | // rule was supposed to deny under auto. |
| 96 | func BuildHeadlessApprovalGate(policy permission.Policy, mode string) *freshHumanHeadlessGate { |
| 97 | // An empty mode is the boot-time placeholder used by interactive frontends |
| 98 | // before they install their real gate. Keep that compatibility path distinct |
| 99 | // from an explicit headless Ask posture, which has nobody to approve it. |
| 100 | if strings.TrimSpace(mode) == "" { |
| 101 | return NewHeadlessPermissionGate(policy) |
| 102 | } |
| 103 | switch normalizeToolApprovalMode(mode) { |
| 104 | case ToolApprovalYolo: |
| 105 | policy.Mode = permission.Allow |
| 106 | return &freshHumanHeadlessGate{gate: permission.NewGate(policy, nil), dynamicBashBypass: true} |
| 107 | case ToolApprovalAuto: |
| 108 | policy.Mode = permission.Allow |
| 109 | return &freshHumanHeadlessGate{gate: permission.NewGate(policy, denyPermissionApprover{})} |
| 110 | case ToolApprovalDontAsk: |
| 111 | policy.Mode = permission.Deny |
| 112 | return &freshHumanHeadlessGate{gate: permission.NewGate(policy, denyPermissionApprover{})} |
| 113 | default: |
| 114 | policy.Mode = permission.Ask |
| 115 | return &freshHumanHeadlessGate{gate: permission.NewGate(policy, denyPermissionApprover{})} |
| 116 | } |
| 117 | } |
| 118 | |
| 119 | // SharedHeadlessGate is a mutable, concurrency-safe holder for the |
| 120 | // non-interactive gate that every headless-only sub-agent surface shares — |
| 121 | // `task`/`read_only_task`, writer-capable skill sub-agents, and the planner |
| 122 | // runner. Those surfaces capture their gate once at construction with no |
| 123 | // rebuild hook of their own, unlike the parent executor's gate (rebuilt in |
| 124 | // place via Agent.SetGate on every SetToolApprovalMode/ |
| 125 | // ApplyHeadlessApprovalMode call). Every consumer holds this same pointer and |
| 126 | // reads through Check, so a runtime approval-mode switch (interactive |
| 127 | // Shift+Tab, or a headless --permission-mode passed at boot) only needs to |
| 128 | // call Update here to keep sub-agents on the same contract as the parent |
| 129 | // instead of silently pinning them to whatever mode was active when they were |
| 130 | // first constructed. |
| 131 | type SharedHeadlessGate struct { |
| 132 | mu sync.RWMutex |
| 133 | policy permission.Policy |
| 134 | gate *freshHumanHeadlessGate |
| 135 | } |
| 136 | |
| 137 | // NewSharedHeadlessGate builds a shared gate holder from the base policy and |
| 138 | // the initial approval mode (see BuildHeadlessApprovalGate for the mode |
| 139 | // contract). |
| 140 | func NewSharedHeadlessGate(policy permission.Policy, mode string) *SharedHeadlessGate { |
| 141 | g := &SharedHeadlessGate{policy: policy} |
| 142 | g.Update(mode) |
| 143 | return g |
| 144 | } |
| 145 | |
| 146 | // Update rebuilds the held gate for a new approval mode. Safe to call |
| 147 | // concurrently with Check (a turn may be mid-flight on another goroutine when |
| 148 | // the user switches modes). |
| 149 | func (g *SharedHeadlessGate) Update(mode string) { |
| 150 | next := BuildHeadlessApprovalGate(g.policy, mode) |
| 151 | g.mu.Lock() |
| 152 | g.gate = next |
| 153 | g.mu.Unlock() |
| 154 | } |
| 155 | |
| 156 | func (g *SharedHeadlessGate) Check(ctx context.Context, toolName string, args json.RawMessage, readOnly bool) (bool, string, error) { |
| 157 | g.mu.RLock() |
| 158 | gate := g.gate |
| 159 | g.mu.RUnlock() |
| 160 | return gate.Check(ctx, toolName, args, readOnly) |
| 161 | } |
| 162 | |
| 163 | func (g *SharedHeadlessGate) ExplicitlyDenies(toolName string, args json.RawMessage) bool { |
| 164 | g.mu.RLock() |
| 165 | gate := g.gate |
| 166 | g.mu.RUnlock() |
| 167 | return gate.ExplicitlyDenies(toolName, args) |
| 168 | } |
| 169 | |
| 170 | type freshHumanHeadlessGate struct { |
| 171 | gate *permission.Gate |
| 172 | dynamicBashBypass bool |
| 173 | allowLowRiskFreshAction func(toolName string, args json.RawMessage) bool |
| 174 | } |
| 175 | |
| 176 | func (g *freshHumanHeadlessGate) Check(ctx context.Context, toolName string, args json.RawMessage, readOnly bool) (bool, string, error) { |
| 177 | if RequiresFreshHumanApprovalTool(toolName) { |
| 178 | if !g.gate.ExplicitlyDenies(toolName, args) && |
| 179 | g.allowLowRiskFreshAction != nil && |
| 180 | g.allowLowRiskFreshAction(toolName, args) { |
| 181 | return true, "", nil |
| 182 | } |
| 183 | return false, "this tool requires fresh human approval and cannot run in a non-interactive session. Use an interactive session or a user-initiated memory command.", nil |
| 184 | } |
| 185 | if strings.EqualFold(toolName, "bash") && permission.BashSubjectRequiresExplicitApproval(permission.Subject(args)) { |
| 186 | if g.gate.Policy.Decide(toolName, readOnly, args) != permission.Allow && !g.dynamicBashBypass { |
| 187 | return false, "this dynamic shell command requires human approval and cannot run in a non-interactive session. Use an interactive session or YOLO mode.", nil |
| 188 | } |
| 189 | } |
| 190 | return g.gate.Check(ctx, toolName, args, readOnly) |
| 191 | } |
| 192 | |
| 193 | func (g *freshHumanHeadlessGate) ExplicitlyDenies(toolName string, args json.RawMessage) bool { |
| 194 | return g.gate.Policy.ExplicitlyDenies(toolName, args) |
| 195 | } |
| 196 | |
| 197 | // preApproved reports whether a tool call can skip the prompt — either the |
| 198 | // posture bypasses it (YOLO / plan-execution window) or a session grant already |
| 199 | // covers the scope. |
| 200 | func (a *approvalManager) preApproved(tool, subject string, args json.RawMessage) bool { |
| 201 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 202 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 203 | return a.bypassAllowsLocked(tool, subject, args) || a.sessionGrantAllowsLocked(tool, subject) |
| 204 | } |
| 205 | |
| 206 | // preApprovedForDecision reports whether a prompt can be skipped for a decision |
| 207 | // class. Fresh user decisions may reuse an explicit session grant, but they are |
| 208 | // never answered by YOLO/full-access or the approved-plan execution window. |
| 209 | func (a *approvalManager) preApprovedForDecision(tool, subject string, args json.RawMessage, fresh bool) bool { |
| 210 | return a.preApprovedForDecisionOptions(tool, subject, args, fresh, false) |
| 211 | } |
| 212 | |
| 213 | func (a *approvalManager) preApprovedForDecisionOptions(tool, subject string, args json.RawMessage, fresh, requireHuman bool) bool { |
| 214 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 215 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 216 | if fresh { |
| 217 | return a.sessionGrantAllowsLocked(tool, subject) |
| 218 | } |
| 219 | if requireHuman { |
| 220 | return a.toolApprovalMode == ToolApprovalYolo || a.sessionGrantAllowsLocked(tool, subject) |
| 221 | } |
| 222 | return a.bypassAllowsLocked(tool, subject, args) || a.sessionGrantAllowsLocked(tool, subject) |
| 223 | } |
| 224 | |
| 225 | func (a *approvalManager) preApprovedForRequiredHuman(tool, subject string) bool { |
| 226 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 227 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 228 | return a.toolApprovalMode == ToolApprovalYolo || a.sessionGrantAllowsLocked(tool, subject) |
| 229 | } |
| 230 | |
| 231 | // register allocates an approval ID, records the pending prompt, and returns the |
| 232 | // reply channel the resolve path will signal. |
| 233 | func (a *approvalManager) register(tool, subject, reason string) (string, chan approvalReply) { |
| 234 | return a.registerWithInput(tool, subject, reason, nil) |
| 235 | } |
| 236 | |
| 237 | func (a *approvalManager) registerWithInput(tool, subject, reason string, rawInput json.RawMessage) (string, chan approvalReply) { |
| 238 | return a.registerDecisionWithInput(tool, subject, reason, rawInput, false, false) |
| 239 | } |
| 240 | |
| 241 | // registerDecision allocates an approval ID for either an ordinary tool |
| 242 | // permission or a fresh user decision. Fresh decisions are not auto-drained when |
| 243 | // the user switches to auto/yolo tool approval while the prompt is visible. |
| 244 | func (a *approvalManager) registerDecision(tool, subject, reason string, fresh, requireHuman bool) (string, chan approvalReply) { |
| 245 | return a.registerDecisionWithInput(tool, subject, reason, nil, fresh, requireHuman) |
| 246 | } |
| 247 | |
| 248 | func (a *approvalManager) registerDecisionWithInput(tool, subject, reason string, rawInput json.RawMessage, fresh, requireHuman bool) (string, chan approvalReply) { |
| 249 | return a.registerDecisionKindWithInput(tool, subject, reason, rawInput, fresh, requireHuman, "", nil) |
| 250 | } |
| 251 | |
| 252 | // registerDecisionKind is registerDecision with optional Kind/Recovery payload |
| 253 | // so Auto Guard cards survive ReplayPendingPrompts. |
| 254 | func (a *approvalManager) registerDecisionKind(tool, subject, reason string, fresh, requireHuman bool, kind string, rec *event.RecoveryApproval) (string, chan approvalReply) { |
| 255 | return a.registerDecisionKindWithInput(tool, subject, reason, nil, fresh, requireHuman, kind, rec) |
| 256 | } |
| 257 | |
| 258 | func (a *approvalManager) registerDecisionKindWithInput(tool, subject, reason string, rawInput json.RawMessage, fresh, requireHuman bool, kind string, rec *event.RecoveryApproval) (string, chan approvalReply) { |
| 259 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 260 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 261 | a.nextID++ |
| 262 | id := strconv.Itoa(a.nextID) |
| 263 | reply := make(chan approvalReply, 1) |
| 264 | autoDrain := false |
| 265 | if !fresh && !requireHuman { |
| 266 | autoDrain = a.autoApprovalWouldAllowLocked(tool, subject) |
| 267 | } |
| 268 | a.approvals[id] = pendingApproval{ |
| 269 | id: id, |
| 270 | tool: tool, subject: subject, reason: reason, rawInput: append(json.RawMessage(nil), rawInput...), fresh: fresh, requireHuman: requireHuman, |
| 271 | autoDrain: autoDrain, kind: kind, recovery: rec, reply: reply, |
| 272 | } |
| 273 | return id, reply |
| 274 | } |
| 275 | |
| 276 | // grantSession records a session-scoped grant so future calls in the same scope |
| 277 | // short-circuit. |
| 278 | func (a *approvalManager) grantSession(tool, subject string) { |
| 279 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 280 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 281 | a.granted[permission.SessionGrantRuleForScope(tool, subject)] = true |
| 282 | } |
| 283 | |
| 284 | func (a *approvalManager) planModeReadOnlyCommandTrusted(prefix string) bool { |
| 285 | prefix = normalizePlanModeReadOnlyCommandPrefix(prefix) |
| 286 | if prefix == "" { |
| 287 | return false |
| 288 | } |
| 289 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 290 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 291 | return a.planModeReadOnlyCommands[prefix] |
| 292 | } |
| 293 | |
| 294 | func (a *approvalManager) grantPlanModeReadOnlyCommand(prefix string) { |
| 295 | prefix = normalizePlanModeReadOnlyCommandPrefix(prefix) |
| 296 | if prefix == "" { |
| 297 | return |
| 298 | } |
| 299 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 300 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 301 | a.planModeReadOnlyCommands[prefix] = true |
| 302 | } |
| 303 | |
| 304 | // SessionAuthorizations is the same-session tool-grant and Plan-mode |
| 305 | // read-only command trust state a controller rebuild must carry forward; see |
| 306 | // Controller.SessionAuthorizations / RestoreSessionAuthorizations. |
| 307 | type SessionAuthorizations struct { |
| 308 | Grants []string |
| 309 | PlanModeReadOnlyCommands []string |
| 310 | } |
| 311 | |
| 312 | func (a *approvalManager) snapshotSessionAuthorizations() SessionAuthorizations { |
| 313 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 314 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 315 | auth := SessionAuthorizations{ |
| 316 | Grants: make([]string, 0, len(a.granted)), |
| 317 | PlanModeReadOnlyCommands: make([]string, 0, len(a.planModeReadOnlyCommands)), |
| 318 | } |
| 319 | for rule := range a.granted { |
| 320 | auth.Grants = append(auth.Grants, rule) |
| 321 | } |
| 322 | for prefix := range a.planModeReadOnlyCommands { |
| 323 | auth.PlanModeReadOnlyCommands = append(auth.PlanModeReadOnlyCommands, prefix) |
| 324 | } |
| 325 | return auth |
| 326 | } |
| 327 | |
| 328 | func (a *approvalManager) restoreSessionAuthorizations(auth SessionAuthorizations) { |
| 329 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 330 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 331 | for _, rule := range auth.Grants { |
| 332 | a.granted[rule] = true |
| 333 | } |
| 334 | for _, prefix := range auth.PlanModeReadOnlyCommands { |
| 335 | a.planModeReadOnlyCommands[prefix] = true |
| 336 | } |
| 337 | } |
| 338 | |
| 339 | // cancel drops a pending approval (timeout/abort path). |
| 340 | func (a *approvalManager) cancel(id string) { |
| 341 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 342 | delete(a.approvals, id) |
| 343 | a.mu.Unlock() |
| 344 | } |
| 345 | |
| 346 | // resolve removes and returns the pending approval for id (Approve path). |
| 347 | func (a *approvalManager) resolve(id string) pendingApproval { |
| 348 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 349 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 350 | p := a.approvals[id] |
| 351 | delete(a.approvals, id) |
| 352 | return p |
| 353 | } |
| 354 | |
| 355 | // resolveTool removes id only when it belongs to the expected specialized |
| 356 | // decision surface. A mismatched bridge call must not consume another approval |
| 357 | // type that happens to share the same short numeric id. |
| 358 | func (a *approvalManager) resolveTool(id, tool string) (pendingApproval, bool) { |
| 359 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 360 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 361 | p, ok := a.approvals[id] |
| 362 | if !ok || p.tool != tool { |
| 363 | return pendingApproval{}, false |
| 364 | } |
| 365 | delete(a.approvals, id) |
| 366 | return p, true |
| 367 | } |
| 368 | |
| 369 | // registerAsk allocates an ask ID, records the pending question batch, and |
| 370 | // returns the reply channel. |
| 371 | func (a *approvalManager) registerAsk(questions []event.AskQuestion) (string, chan []event.AskAnswer) { |
| 372 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 373 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 374 | a.nextID++ |
| 375 | id := strconv.Itoa(a.nextID) |
| 376 | reply := make(chan []event.AskAnswer, 1) |
| 377 | a.asks[id] = pendingAsk{questions: questions, reply: reply} |
| 378 | return id, reply |
| 379 | } |
| 380 | |
| 381 | // cancelAsk drops a pending ask (timeout/abort path). |
| 382 | func (a *approvalManager) cancelAsk(id string) { |
| 383 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 384 | delete(a.asks, id) |
| 385 | a.mu.Unlock() |
| 386 | } |
| 387 | |
| 388 | // resolveAsk removes and returns the pending ask for id (AnswerQuestion path). |
| 389 | func (a *approvalManager) resolveAsk(id string) (pendingAsk, bool) { |
| 390 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 391 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 392 | p, ok := a.asks[id] |
| 393 | delete(a.asks, id) |
| 394 | return p, ok |
| 395 | } |
| 396 | |
| 397 | // clearAll drops every in-flight prompt without signaling — the cancel path, |
| 398 | // where blocked waiters unblock via their cancelled context instead. |
| 399 | func (a *approvalManager) clearAll() { |
| 400 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 401 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 402 | clear(a.approvals) |
| 403 | clear(a.asks) |
| 404 | } |
| 405 | |
| 406 | // clearKind drops pending approvals of one specialized kind. Session recovery |
| 407 | // state uses this during rotations so a card from the previous session cannot |
| 408 | // be answered against the newly active one. |
| 409 | func (a *approvalManager) clearKind(kind string) { |
| 410 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 411 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 412 | for id, pending := range a.approvals { |
| 413 | if pending.kind == kind { |
| 414 | delete(a.approvals, id) |
| 415 | } |
| 416 | } |
| 417 | } |
| 418 | |
| 419 | // hasPending reports whether any prompt is awaiting a user decision. |
| 420 | func (a *approvalManager) hasPending() bool { |
| 421 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 422 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 423 | return len(a.approvals) > 0 || len(a.asks) > 0 |
| 424 | } |
| 425 | |
| 426 | // mode returns the normalized runtime approval posture. |
| 427 | func (a *approvalManager) mode() string { |
| 428 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 429 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 430 | return normalizeToolApprovalMode(a.toolApprovalMode) |
| 431 | } |
| 432 | |
| 433 | // setMode applies a (pre-normalized) posture and drains any pending approvals |
| 434 | // the new posture should auto-allow, returning them for the caller to signal |
| 435 | // {allow:true} after unlocking. |
| 436 | func (a *approvalManager) setMode(mode string) []drainedApproval { |
| 437 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 438 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 439 | a.toolApprovalMode = mode |
| 440 | switch mode { |
| 441 | case ToolApprovalAuto: |
| 442 | return a.drainLocked(false) |
| 443 | case ToolApprovalYolo: |
| 444 | return a.drainLocked(true) |
| 445 | } |
| 446 | return nil |
| 447 | } |
| 448 | |
| 449 | // setPlanAutoApprove toggles the just-approved-plan execution window. |
| 450 | func (a *approvalManager) setPlanAutoApprove(on bool) { |
| 451 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 452 | a.planAutoApprove = on |
| 453 | a.mu.Unlock() |
| 454 | } |
| 455 | |
| 456 | // waitContext bounds the blocking wait by approvalTimeout when set. |
| 457 | func (a *approvalManager) waitContext(ctx context.Context) (context.Context, context.CancelFunc) { |
| 458 | if a.approvalTimeout <= 0 { |
| 459 | return ctx, func() {} |
| 460 | } |
| 461 | return context.WithTimeout(ctx, a.approvalTimeout) |
| 462 | } |
| 463 | |
| 464 | // snapshotPrompts copies the in-flight prompts for re-emission to a reconnected |
| 465 | // frontend (ReplayPendingPrompts). |
| 466 | func (a *approvalManager) snapshotPrompts() ([]event.Approval, []event.Ask) { |
| 467 | a.mu.Lock() |
| 468 | defer a.mu.Unlock() |
| 469 | approvals := make([]event.Approval, 0, len(a.approvals)) |
| 470 | for id, p := range a.approvals { |
| 471 | approvals = append(approvals, event.Approval{ |
| 472 | ID: id, Tool: p.tool, Subject: p.subject, Reason: p.reason, RawInput: append(json.RawMessage(nil), p.rawInput...), Fresh: p.fresh, |
| 473 | Kind: p.kind, Recovery: p.recovery, |
| 474 | }) |
| 475 | } |
| 476 | asks := make([]event.Ask, 0, len(a.asks)) |
| 477 | for id, p := range a.asks { |
| 478 | asks = append(asks, event.Ask{ID: id, Questions: p.questions}) |
| 479 | } |
| 480 | return approvals, asks |
| 481 | } |
| 482 | |
| 483 | func normalizePlanModeReadOnlyCommandPrefix(prefix string) string { |
| 484 | return strings.Join(strings.Fields(strings.TrimSpace(prefix)), " ") |
| 485 | } |
| 486 | |
| 487 | // --- decision helpers (caller holds a.mu) --- |
| 488 | |
| 489 | func (a *approvalManager) bypassAllowsLocked(tool, subject string, args json.RawMessage) bool { |
| 490 | if requiresFreshApprovalTool(tool) { |
| 491 | return false |
| 492 | } |
| 493 | if a.toolApprovalMode == ToolApprovalYolo { |
| 494 | return true |
| 495 | } |
| 496 | if !a.planAutoApprove { |
| 497 | return false |
| 498 | } |
| 499 | policy := a.policy |
| 500 | policy.Mode = permission.Allow |
| 501 | if len(args) > 0 { |
| 502 | return policy.Decide(tool, false, args) == permission.Allow |
| 503 | } |
| 504 | return policy.DecideSubject(tool, false, subject) == permission.Allow |
| 505 | } |
| 506 | |
| 507 | func (a *approvalManager) autoApprovalWouldAllowLocked(tool, subject string) bool { |
| 508 | if requiresFreshApprovalTool(tool) { |
| 509 | return false |
| 510 | } |
| 511 | policy := a.policy |
| 512 | policy.Mode = permission.Allow |
| 513 | return policy.DecideSubject(tool, false, subject) == permission.Allow |
| 514 | } |
| 515 | |
| 516 | func (a *approvalManager) sessionGrantAllowsLocked(tool, subject string) bool { |
| 517 | if requiresFreshApprovalTool(tool) && !allowsFreshSessionGrantTool(tool) { |
| 518 | return false |
| 519 | } |
| 520 | for rule := range a.granted { |
| 521 | if permission.RuleMatchesString(rule, tool, subject) { |
| 522 | return true |
| 523 | } |
| 524 | } |
| 525 | return false |
| 526 | } |
| 527 | |
| 528 | // drainedApproval is a pending approval removed by a posture switch, keeping |
| 529 | // its prompt id so frontends can dismiss exactly the prompts the new posture |
| 530 | // resolved (fresh/plan/memory prompts stay pending and must stay visible). |
| 531 | type drainedApproval struct { |
| 532 | id string |
| 533 | reply chan approvalReply |
| 534 | } |
| 535 | |
| 536 | // drainLocked removes every pending approval the new posture should auto-allow |
| 537 | // and returns them; caller holds a.mu and sends {allow:true} after unlocking. |
| 538 | func (a *approvalManager) drainLocked(includeExplicitAsk bool) []drainedApproval { |
| 539 | pending := make([]drainedApproval, 0, len(a.approvals)) |
| 540 | for id, approval := range a.approvals { |
| 541 | if approval.fresh || requiresFreshApprovalTool(approval.tool) { |
| 542 | continue |
| 543 | } |
| 544 | if approval.requireHuman && !includeExplicitAsk { |
| 545 | continue |
| 546 | } |
| 547 | if !includeExplicitAsk && !approval.autoDrain { |
| 548 | continue |
| 549 | } |
| 550 | delete(a.approvals, id) |
| 551 | pending = append(pending, drainedApproval{id: id, reply: approval.reply}) |
| 552 | } |
| 553 | return pending |
| 554 | } |
| 555 | |
| 556 | // --- pure approval helpers --- |
| 557 | |
| 558 | func normalizeToolApprovalMode(mode string) string { |
| 559 | switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(mode)) { |
| 560 | case ToolApprovalAuto, "approve", "allow": |
| 561 | return ToolApprovalAuto |
| 562 | case "dontask", "dont-ask", "deny": |
| 563 | return ToolApprovalDontAsk |
| 564 | case ToolApprovalYolo, "full", "full-access", "bypass": |
| 565 | return ToolApprovalYolo |
| 566 | default: |
| 567 | return ToolApprovalAsk |
| 568 | } |
| 569 | } |
| 570 | |
| 571 | // RequiresFreshHumanApprovalTool reports whether a tool's unsafe variants must |
| 572 | // be answered by a human decision, not by YOLO/auto approval, Guardian, or a |
| 573 | // non-interactive nil approver. A controller that owns the scoped memory store |
| 574 | // may still classify a bounded new project memory as create-only and allow that |
| 575 | // narrow operation in interactive or headless mode. |
| 576 | func RequiresFreshHumanApprovalTool(tool string) bool { |
| 577 | switch tool { |
| 578 | case planApprovalTool, memoryRememberTool, memoryForgetTool, SandboxEscapeApprovalTool, ManagedConfigWriteApprovalTool: |
| 579 | return true |
| 580 | default: |
| 581 | return false |
| 582 | } |
| 583 | } |
| 584 | |
| 585 | func requiresFreshApprovalTool(tool string) bool { |
| 586 | return RequiresFreshHumanApprovalTool(tool) |
| 587 | } |
| 588 | |
| 589 | func allowsFreshSessionGrantTool(tool string) bool { |
| 590 | switch tool { |
| 591 | case SandboxEscapeApprovalTool, ManagedConfigWriteApprovalTool: |
| 592 | return true |
| 593 | default: |
| 594 | return false |
| 595 | } |
| 596 | } |
| 597 | |
| 598 | func approvalNotificationText(tool, subject string) string { |
| 599 | if requiresFreshApprovalTool(tool) { |
| 600 | return fmt.Sprintf(i18n.M.ApprovalNeededFmt, tool) |
| 601 | } |
| 602 | if subject == "" { |
| 603 | return fmt.Sprintf(i18n.M.ApprovalNeededFmt, tool) |
| 604 | } |
| 605 | return fmt.Sprintf(i18n.M.ApprovalNeededWithSubjectFmt, tool, subject) |
| 606 | } |
| 607 | |
| 608 | func permissionRequestHookPayload(tool, subject string, args json.RawMessage) (string, json.RawMessage, bool) { |
| 609 | switch tool { |
| 610 | case planApprovalTool: |
| 611 | return "", nil, false |
| 612 | case memoryRememberTool, memoryForgetTool: |
| 613 | return "", nil, true |
| 614 | default: |
| 615 | return subject, args, true |
| 616 | } |
| 617 | } |
| 618 |