| 1 | //! Codewhale-account machine tokens (`CODEWHALE_API_KEY`). |
| 2 | //! |
| 3 | //! This is the CI path. A machine token authenticates as the account with no |
| 4 | //! local session file and no browser, and it is deliberately weaker than the |
| 5 | //! interactive session: it may call exactly two read-only routes and can never |
| 6 | //! mint, list, or revoke a key. Those asymmetries are enforced by the control |
| 7 | //! plane; this module refuses to blur them locally so a CI failure reads as a |
| 8 | //! credential problem, a configuration problem, or a CLI bug — never as an |
| 9 | //! ambiguous 403. |
| 10 | //! |
| 11 | //! Two rules are load-bearing and are held by tests below: |
| 12 | //! |
| 13 | //! * The token value never leaves this module. It is written to no file, no |
| 14 | //! log, and no diagnostic. Everything that identifies a key in output is the |
| 15 | //! 32-character non-secret head (`cwc_key_` + the 24-hex id), which is |
| 16 | //! exactly what an operator needs to match a leaked key to a listing row. |
| 17 | //! * A machine credential never silently downgrades to the interactive |
| 18 | //! session. Falling back would run CI as the wrong identity. |
| 19 | |
| 20 | use std::fmt; |
| 21 | use std::io::Write; |
| 22 | use std::time::Duration; |
| 23 | |
| 24 | use anyhow::{Context, Result, anyhow, bail}; |
| 25 | use clap::{Args, Subcommand}; |
| 26 | use codewhale_config::ProviderKind; |
| 27 | use codewhale_config::route::parse_route_kind; |
| 28 | use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; |
| 29 | |
| 30 | use super::{ |
| 31 | CloudClient, CloudRequest, CloudResponse, CloudTransport, HttpMethod, printable, |
| 32 | validate_api_base, |
| 33 | }; |
| 34 | |
| 35 | /// The only environment variable that carries a machine token. |
| 36 | pub(crate) const MACHINE_KEY_ENV: &str = "CODEWHALE_API_KEY"; |
| 37 | /// Machine-token API origin override, checked before the device-flow origin. |
| 38 | pub(crate) const MACHINE_API_BASE_ENV: &str = "CODEWHALE_API_BASE"; |
| 39 | |
| 40 | /// Fixed literal no other Codewhale credential uses, so `grep -r cwc_key_` |
| 41 | /// finds every leaked key. |
| 42 | const TOKEN_PREFIX: &str = "cwc_key_"; |
| 43 | /// `cwc_key_` + 24 hex + `_` + 43 base64url. |
| 44 | const TOKEN_LEN: usize = 76; |
| 45 | /// `cwc_key_` + the 24-hex key id. Non-secret by design: it is the display |
| 46 | /// prefix a listing shows, so printing it is how an operator maps a token in a |
| 47 | /// build log to the one row they must revoke. |
| 48 | const TOKEN_HEAD_LEN: usize = 32; |
| 49 | const KEY_ID_LEN: usize = 24; |
| 50 | |
| 51 | /// The closed scope set. Widening it is a control-plane change, not a CLI one. |
| 52 | /// |
| 53 | /// `models:infer` is what lets a key reach the Codewhale API's model routes |
| 54 | /// (`/v1/models`, `/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/messages`); the other two stay |
| 55 | /// the account and agent read/run scopes. |
| 56 | const SCOPES: [&str; 3] = ["account:read", "agent:run", "models:infer"]; |
| 57 | |
| 58 | /// Per-account ceiling quoted by `api_key_limit_reached`. |
| 59 | const MAX_LIVE_KEYS: usize = 25; |
| 60 | |
| 61 | const MAX_KEY_NAME_CHARS: usize = 64; |
| 62 | const MAX_EXPIRY_DAYS: u32 = 365; |
| 63 | |
| 64 | /// Exit codes. CI logs must be able to tell a bad credential from a missing |
| 65 | /// model without parsing English, so the classes are distinct integers. |
| 66 | pub(crate) const EXIT_INPUT: i32 = 2; |
| 67 | pub(crate) const EXIT_AUTH: i32 = 3; |
| 68 | pub(crate) const EXIT_AGENT_UNCONFIGURED: i32 = 4; |
| 69 | pub(crate) const EXIT_LIMIT: i32 = 5; |
| 70 | pub(crate) const EXIT_UNAVAILABLE: i32 = 6; |
| 71 | pub(crate) const EXIT_TRANSPORT: i32 = 7; |
| 72 | |
| 73 | /// Attempts for an idempotent request, including the first. |
| 74 | const MAX_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 3; |
| 75 | const BASE_BACKOFF_MS: u64 = 500; |
| 76 | const MAX_BACKOFF_MS: u64 = 30_000; |
| 77 | |
| 78 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 79 | // Token |
| 80 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 81 | |
| 82 | /// A validated machine token. |
| 83 | /// |
| 84 | /// No `Display`, and `Debug` prints only the non-secret head, so the value |
| 85 | /// cannot reach a panic message or a `{:?}` dump by accident. |
| 86 | #[derive(Clone)] |
| 87 | pub(crate) struct MachineKey(String); |
| 88 | |
| 89 | impl MachineKey { |
| 90 | /// Validate a raw environment value without sending it anywhere. |
| 91 | /// |
| 92 | /// A malformed value is almost always a truncated or shell-mangled paste. |
| 93 | /// Saying so locally is strictly more useful than a server 401, which |
| 94 | /// cannot distinguish "you pasted half a key" from "this key was deleted". |
| 95 | pub(crate) fn parse(raw: &str) -> Result<Self> { |
| 96 | let value = unwrap_quoted(raw); |
| 97 | if !token_is_well_formed(value) { |
| 98 | bail!( |
| 99 | "{MACHINE_KEY_ENV} is not a well-formed Codewhale API key, so it was not sent. \ |
| 100 | Expected {TOKEN_LEN} characters shaped `cwc_key_<24 hex>_<43 chars>`; got {} characters. \ |
| 101 | That is almost always a truncated or shell-mangled paste — re-copy the value, or create a \ |
| 102 | new key with `codewhale account api-keys create`.", |
| 103 | value.chars().count() |
| 104 | ); |
| 105 | } |
| 106 | Ok(Self(value.to_string())) |
| 107 | } |
| 108 | |
| 109 | /// The non-secret 32-character head: `cwc_key_` plus the 24-hex key id. |
| 110 | #[must_use] |
| 111 | pub(crate) fn head(&self) -> &str { |
| 112 | &self.0[..TOKEN_HEAD_LEN] |
| 113 | } |
| 114 | |
| 115 | /// Hand the full token to the transport. The only caller is this module. |
| 116 | fn expose(&self) -> String { |
| 117 | self.0.clone() |
| 118 | } |
| 119 | } |
| 120 | |
| 121 | impl fmt::Debug for MachineKey { |
| 122 | fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result { |
| 123 | // Head only. A machine token must survive being logged. |
| 124 | write!(formatter, "MachineKey({}…)", self.head()) |
| 125 | } |
| 126 | } |
| 127 | |
| 128 | /// Trim whitespace and one wrapping pair of quotes. CI secret pasting adds |
| 129 | /// both, and neither is part of the credential. |
| 130 | fn unwrap_quoted(raw: &str) -> &str { |
| 131 | let trimmed = raw.trim(); |
| 132 | for quote in ['"', '\''] { |
| 133 | if trimmed.len() >= 2 && trimmed.starts_with(quote) && trimmed.ends_with(quote) { |
| 134 | return trimmed[1..trimmed.len() - 1].trim(); |
| 135 | } |
| 136 | } |
| 137 | trimmed |
| 138 | } |
| 139 | |
| 140 | /// `^cwc_key_[0-9a-f]{24}_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$`, hand-rolled to avoid a regex |
| 141 | /// dependency in a credential path. |
| 142 | fn token_is_well_formed(value: &str) -> bool { |
| 143 | let bytes = value.as_bytes(); |
| 144 | if bytes.len() != TOKEN_LEN || !value.is_ascii() || !value.starts_with(TOKEN_PREFIX) { |
| 145 | return false; |
| 146 | } |
| 147 | let id_end = TOKEN_PREFIX.len() + KEY_ID_LEN; |
| 148 | if bytes[TOKEN_PREFIX.len()..id_end] |
| 149 | .iter() |
| 150 | .any(|byte| !byte.is_ascii_digit() && !(b'a'..=b'f').contains(byte)) |
| 151 | { |
| 152 | return false; |
| 153 | } |
| 154 | if bytes[id_end] != b'_' { |
| 155 | return false; |
| 156 | } |
| 157 | bytes[id_end + 1..] |
| 158 | .iter() |
| 159 | .all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(byte, b'_' | b'-')) |
| 160 | } |
| 161 | |
| 162 | /// Deferred read of `CODEWHALE_API_KEY`. |
| 163 | /// |
| 164 | /// Presence and validity are separate questions: a management command must |
| 165 | /// refuse locally when a key is *present* (rule: a key cannot manage keys) |
| 166 | /// without first demanding that the key be well formed. |
| 167 | #[derive(Clone, Default)] |
| 168 | pub(crate) struct MachineKeyEnv { |
| 169 | raw: Option<String>, |
| 170 | } |
| 171 | |
| 172 | impl MachineKeyEnv { |
| 173 | /// Read the process environment. |
| 174 | #[must_use] |
| 175 | pub(crate) fn from_process_env() -> Self { |
| 176 | Self::from_raw(std::env::var(MACHINE_KEY_ENV).ok().as_deref()) |
| 177 | } |
| 178 | |
| 179 | /// Build from an explicit value. Empty and whitespace-only mean "unset"; |
| 180 | /// an exported-but-empty CI secret is an unset secret, not a bad one. |
| 181 | #[must_use] |
| 182 | pub(crate) fn from_raw(raw: Option<&str>) -> Self { |
| 183 | Self { |
| 184 | raw: raw |
| 185 | .map(str::to_string) |
| 186 | .filter(|value| !value.trim().is_empty()), |
| 187 | } |
| 188 | } |
| 189 | |
| 190 | /// Whether a machine credential is present at all, valid or not. |
| 191 | #[must_use] |
| 192 | pub(crate) fn is_present(&self) -> bool { |
| 193 | self.raw.is_some() |
| 194 | } |
| 195 | |
| 196 | /// Validate the key if one is set. |
| 197 | pub(crate) fn resolve(&self) -> Result<Option<MachineKey>> { |
| 198 | self.raw.as_deref().map(MachineKey::parse).transpose() |
| 199 | } |
| 200 | |
| 201 | /// Validate the key, requiring one to be set. |
| 202 | pub(crate) fn require(&self) -> Result<MachineKey> { |
| 203 | self.resolve()?.ok_or_else(|| { |
| 204 | anyhow!( |
| 205 | "This command authenticates with a Codewhale account API key. \ |
| 206 | Set {MACHINE_KEY_ENV}, or create one with `codewhale account api-keys create` after \ |
| 207 | `codewhale login`." |
| 208 | ) |
| 209 | }) |
| 210 | } |
| 211 | } |
| 212 | |
| 213 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 214 | // Base URL |
| 215 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 216 | |
| 217 | /// Resolve the account API origin. |
| 218 | /// |
| 219 | /// Order: explicit `--api-base`, then `CODEWHALE_API_BASE`, then whatever the |
| 220 | /// device flow already uses, then the production default. The flag outranks |
| 221 | /// the variable for the same reason `--api-key` would outrank the environment: |
| 222 | /// the nearer, more deliberate signal wins. |
| 223 | pub(crate) fn resolve_api_base( |
| 224 | flag: Option<&str>, |
| 225 | machine_base: Option<&str>, |
| 226 | device_base: Option<&str>, |
| 227 | default_base: &str, |
| 228 | ) -> String { |
| 229 | [flag, machine_base, device_base] |
| 230 | .into_iter() |
| 231 | .flatten() |
| 232 | .map(str::trim) |
| 233 | .find(|value| !value.is_empty()) |
| 234 | .map_or_else( |
| 235 | || default_base.to_string(), |
| 236 | |value| value.trim_end_matches('/').to_string(), |
| 237 | ) |
| 238 | } |
| 239 | |
| 240 | /// Reject a plaintext origin for a non-loopback host. |
| 241 | /// |
| 242 | /// A machine token is a bearer credential with no replay protection, so |
| 243 | /// sending it over cleartext to a remote host is a hard error rather than a |
| 244 | /// warning: a warning in CI is a line nobody reads. |
| 245 | pub(crate) fn require_secure_base(api_base: &str) -> Result<()> { |
| 246 | validate_api_base(api_base) |
| 247 | .map(|_| ()) |
| 248 | .with_context(|| format!("refusing to send a {MACHINE_KEY_ENV} credential to {api_base}")) |
| 249 | } |
| 250 | |
| 251 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 252 | // Error envelope |
| 253 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 254 | |
| 255 | #[derive(Debug, Default, Deserialize)] |
| 256 | struct ErrorEnvelope { |
| 257 | #[serde(default)] |
| 258 | message: String, |
| 259 | #[serde(default)] |
| 260 | details: ErrorDetails, |
| 261 | } |
| 262 | |
| 263 | #[derive(Debug, Default, Deserialize)] |
| 264 | struct ErrorDetails { |
| 265 | #[serde(default)] |
| 266 | code: String, |
| 267 | #[serde(default)] |
| 268 | fields: Vec<String>, |
| 269 | } |
| 270 | |
| 271 | /// A classified control-plane failure. |
| 272 | /// |
| 273 | /// `code` is read from `details.code`, never inferred from the HTTP status: |
| 274 | /// three different 401s and two different 403s need three and two different |
| 275 | /// fixes, and only the code tells them apart. |
| 276 | #[derive(Debug, Clone)] |
| 277 | pub(crate) struct MachineError { |
| 278 | pub(crate) status: u16, |
| 279 | pub(crate) code: String, |
| 280 | pub(crate) message: String, |
| 281 | pub(crate) exit_code: i32, |
| 282 | pub(crate) retryable: bool, |
| 283 | } |
| 284 | |
| 285 | impl fmt::Display for MachineError { |
| 286 | fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result { |
| 287 | formatter.write_str(&self.message) |
| 288 | } |
| 289 | } |
| 290 | |
| 291 | impl std::error::Error for MachineError {} |
| 292 | |
| 293 | impl MachineError { |
| 294 | fn new(status: u16, code: &str, message: impl Into<String>, exit_code: i32) -> Self { |
| 295 | Self { |
| 296 | status, |
| 297 | code: code.to_string(), |
| 298 | message: message.into(), |
| 299 | exit_code, |
| 300 | retryable: false, |
| 301 | } |
| 302 | } |
| 303 | |
| 304 | fn retryable(mut self) -> Self { |
| 305 | self.retryable = true; |
| 306 | self |
| 307 | } |
| 308 | |
| 309 | /// Transport failure: no HTTP status was ever produced. |
| 310 | pub(crate) fn transport(message: impl Into<String>) -> Self { |
| 311 | Self::new(0, "transport_error", message, EXIT_TRANSPORT).retryable() |
| 312 | } |
| 313 | } |
| 314 | |
| 315 | /// Map a non-success response onto an actionable local error. |
| 316 | pub(crate) fn classify(response: &CloudResponse) -> MachineError { |
| 317 | let envelope = serde_json::from_slice::<ErrorEnvelope>(&response.body).unwrap_or_default(); |
| 318 | let code = sanitize_code(&envelope.details.code); |
| 319 | let server_message = sanitize_message(&envelope.message); |
| 320 | let status = response.status; |
| 321 | |
| 322 | match code.as_str() { |
| 323 | "api_key_invalid" => MachineError::new( |
| 324 | status, |
| 325 | &code, |
| 326 | "That Codewhale API key is not valid. It may have been mistyped, truncated, or \ |
| 327 | deleted. Create a new one with `codewhale account api-keys create`.", |
| 328 | EXIT_AUTH, |
| 329 | ), |
| 330 | "api_key_revoked" => MachineError::new( |
| 331 | status, |
| 332 | &code, |
| 333 | format!( |
| 334 | "This Codewhale API key was revoked. Create a new one and update {MACHINE_KEY_ENV}." |
| 335 | ), |
| 336 | EXIT_AUTH, |
| 337 | ), |
| 338 | "api_key_expired" => MachineError::new( |
| 339 | status, |
| 340 | &code, |
| 341 | format!( |
| 342 | "This Codewhale API key expired. Create a new one and update {MACHINE_KEY_ENV}." |
| 343 | ), |
| 344 | EXIT_AUTH, |
| 345 | ), |
| 346 | "api_key_required" => MachineError::new( |
| 347 | status, |
| 348 | &code, |
| 349 | "This Codewhale route accepts only an account API key, but the CLI sent an \ |
| 350 | interactive session token. That is a Codewhale CLI bug, not a problem with your \ |
| 351 | credentials — please report it.", |
| 352 | EXIT_AUTH, |
| 353 | ), |
| 354 | "auth_required" => MachineError::new( |
| 355 | status, |
| 356 | &code, |
| 357 | format!( |
| 358 | "No Codewhale credential reached the server. Set {MACHINE_KEY_ENV}, or run \ |
| 359 | `codewhale login`." |
| 360 | ), |
| 361 | EXIT_AUTH, |
| 362 | ), |
| 363 | "api_key_route_denied" => MachineError::new( |
| 364 | status, |
| 365 | &code, |
| 366 | "A Codewhale API key cannot be used for this command. Managing API keys needs an \ |
| 367 | interactive login. Run `codewhale login`.", |
| 368 | EXIT_AUTH, |
| 369 | ), |
| 370 | "api_key_scope_denied" => MachineError::new( |
| 371 | status, |
| 372 | &code, |
| 373 | join_message( |
| 374 | &server_message, |
| 375 | "This key does not have the scope this command needs. Create a new key with it \ |
| 376 | using `codewhale account api-keys create --scope <scope>`.", |
| 377 | ), |
| 378 | EXIT_AUTH, |
| 379 | ), |
| 380 | "account_agent_model_unconfigured" => MachineError::new( |
| 381 | status, |
| 382 | &code, |
| 383 | "This Codewhale account has no agent model configured. Choose one in the Codewhale \ |
| 384 | app, or run `codewhale account keys set <provider>`.", |
| 385 | EXIT_AGENT_UNCONFIGURED, |
| 386 | ), |
| 387 | "api_key_limit_reached" => MachineError::new( |
| 388 | status, |
| 389 | &code, |
| 390 | format!( |
| 391 | "This account already has {MAX_LIVE_KEYS} active API keys. Revoke one first with \ |
| 392 | `codewhale account api-keys revoke <id>`." |
| 393 | ), |
| 394 | EXIT_LIMIT, |
| 395 | ), |
| 396 | "api_key_field_unknown" => { |
| 397 | let fields = envelope |
| 398 | .details |
| 399 | .fields |
| 400 | .iter() |
| 401 | .filter_map(|field| { |
| 402 | let field = sanitize_code(field); |
| 403 | (!field.is_empty()).then_some(field) |
| 404 | }) |
| 405 | .collect::<Vec<_>>(); |
| 406 | let detail = if fields.is_empty() { |
| 407 | String::new() |
| 408 | } else { |
| 409 | format!("Unknown field(s): {}.", fields.join(", ")) |
| 410 | }; |
| 411 | MachineError::new( |
| 412 | status, |
| 413 | &code, |
| 414 | join_message(&server_message, &detail), |
| 415 | EXIT_INPUT, |
| 416 | ) |
| 417 | } |
| 418 | "api_key_name_invalid" |
| 419 | | "api_key_expiry_invalid" |
| 420 | | "api_key_scopes_invalid" |
| 421 | | "api_key_body_invalid" => MachineError::new( |
| 422 | status, |
| 423 | &code, |
| 424 | // Input errors are the server describing the request this CLI |
| 425 | // built, so its own wording is the most precise thing available. |
| 426 | join_message(&server_message, "Adjust the command and run it again."), |
| 427 | EXIT_INPUT, |
| 428 | ), |
| 429 | "api_key_not_found" => MachineError::new( |
| 430 | status, |
| 431 | &code, |
| 432 | // An unknown id, a malformed id, and another account's id are |
| 433 | // deliberately indistinguishable, so revoke cannot probe for |
| 434 | // foreign key ids. The message must not pretend otherwise. |
| 435 | "No such Codewhale API key. Run `codewhale account api-keys list` to see the ids \ |
| 436 | this account owns.", |
| 437 | EXIT_INPUT, |
| 438 | ), |
| 439 | "api_key_unavailable" => MachineError::new( |
| 440 | status, |
| 441 | &code, |
| 442 | "This Codewhale deployment does not support API keys yet. Retrying will not help; \ |
| 443 | the deployment needs a control-plane upgrade.", |
| 444 | EXIT_UNAVAILABLE, |
| 445 | ), |
| 446 | "control_plane_not_attached" => MachineError::new( |
| 447 | status, |
| 448 | &code, |
| 449 | "This Codewhale edge deployment has not been attached to the account control plane, \ |
| 450 | so the API key routes are not reachable from it. This is a routing/deployment fix, not a \ |
| 451 | missing feature and not a bad key.", |
| 452 | EXIT_UNAVAILABLE, |
| 453 | ), |
| 454 | _ => classify_by_status(status, &code, &server_message), |
| 455 | } |
| 456 | } |
| 457 | |
| 458 | /// Fallback when the body carried no recognizable `details.code`. |
| 459 | fn classify_by_status(status: u16, code: &str, server_message: &str) -> MachineError { |
| 460 | let code = if code.is_empty() { "unknown" } else { code }; |
| 461 | let context = if server_message.is_empty() { |
| 462 | format!("The Codewhale service returned HTTP {status}.") |
| 463 | } else { |
| 464 | format!("The Codewhale service returned HTTP {status}: {server_message}") |
| 465 | }; |
| 466 | match status { |
| 467 | 401 | 403 => MachineError::new(status, code, context, EXIT_AUTH), |
| 468 | 429 => MachineError::new( |
| 469 | status, |
| 470 | code, |
| 471 | format!("{context} The request was rate limited."), |
| 472 | EXIT_TRANSPORT, |
| 473 | ) |
| 474 | .retryable(), |
| 475 | 400 | 404 | 409 | 422 => MachineError::new(status, code, context, EXIT_INPUT), |
| 476 | 500..=504 => MachineError::new(status, code, context, EXIT_TRANSPORT).retryable(), |
| 477 | _ => MachineError::new(status, code, context, EXIT_TRANSPORT), |
| 478 | } |
| 479 | } |
| 480 | |
| 481 | fn join_message(primary: &str, fallback: &str) -> String { |
| 482 | match (primary.is_empty(), fallback.is_empty()) { |
| 483 | (true, _) => fallback.to_string(), |
| 484 | (false, true) => primary.to_string(), |
| 485 | (false, false) => format!("{primary} {fallback}"), |
| 486 | } |
| 487 | } |
| 488 | |
| 489 | fn sanitize_code(code: &str) -> String { |
| 490 | let code = code.trim(); |
| 491 | if code.is_empty() |
| 492 | || code.len() > 80 |
| 493 | || !code |
| 494 | .bytes() |
| 495 | .all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(byte, b'_' | b'-' | b'.')) |
| 496 | { |
| 497 | return String::new(); |
| 498 | } |
| 499 | code.to_string() |
| 500 | } |
| 501 | |
| 502 | /// Server prose is untrusted output. Strip control characters and bound it so |
| 503 | /// a hostile or broken body cannot rewrite the terminal. |
| 504 | fn sanitize_message(message: &str) -> String { |
| 505 | printable(message) |
| 506 | } |
| 507 | |
| 508 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 509 | // Retry |
| 510 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 511 | |
| 512 | /// Whether a request may be replayed. |
| 513 | #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)] |
| 514 | pub(crate) enum Retry { |
| 515 | /// Safe to replay: GET, and DELETE revoke, which the server defines as |
| 516 | /// idempotent (a repeat returns the identical `revokedAt`). |
| 517 | Idempotent, |
| 518 | /// Never replayed. `POST /api/account/api-keys` is the whole reason this |
| 519 | /// variant exists: a retry that actually succeeded server-side mints a |
| 520 | /// second key whose secret the caller never sees, and therefore can never |
| 521 | /// revoke by id from the output they have. |
| 522 | Never, |
| 523 | } |
| 524 | |
| 525 | /// Backoff for `attempt` (1-based), honoring a server `Retry-After`. |
| 526 | /// |
| 527 | /// Jitter is derived from the attempt number rather than a clock or an RNG so |
| 528 | /// the schedule is deterministic and can be asserted in tests. |
| 529 | pub(crate) fn backoff_delay(attempt: u32, retry_after_seconds: Option<u64>) -> Duration { |
| 530 | if let Some(seconds) = retry_after_seconds { |
| 531 | return Duration::from_millis((seconds.saturating_mul(1000)).min(MAX_BACKOFF_MS)); |
| 532 | } |
| 533 | let exponential = BASE_BACKOFF_MS.saturating_mul(1u64 << attempt.min(6).saturating_sub(1)); |
| 534 | let jitter = u64::from(attempt).saturating_mul(137) % 250; |
| 535 | Duration::from_millis(exponential.saturating_add(jitter).min(MAX_BACKOFF_MS)) |
| 536 | } |
| 537 | |
| 538 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 539 | // Wire types |
| 540 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 541 | |
| 542 | /// Non-secret account record returned beside a machine-key whoami. |
| 543 | #[derive(Debug, Default, Deserialize)] |
| 544 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 545 | pub(crate) struct MachineAccount { |
| 546 | #[serde(default)] |
| 547 | pub(crate) id: String, |
| 548 | #[serde(default)] |
| 549 | pub(crate) display_name: String, |
| 550 | #[serde(default)] |
| 551 | pub(crate) email: String, |
| 552 | #[serde(default)] |
| 553 | pub(crate) region: String, |
| 554 | #[serde(default)] |
| 555 | pub(crate) plan: String, |
| 556 | } |
| 557 | |
| 558 | /// Machine-key metadata. Deliberately has no `secret` field: the plaintext |
| 559 | /// exists in one create response and nowhere else, and a type that cannot |
| 560 | /// represent it cannot accidentally carry it into a listing or a log. |
| 561 | #[derive(Debug, Default, Deserialize)] |
| 562 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 563 | pub(crate) struct ApiKeyMetadata { |
| 564 | #[serde(default)] |
| 565 | pub(crate) id: String, |
| 566 | #[serde(default)] |
| 567 | pub(crate) name: String, |
| 568 | #[serde(default)] |
| 569 | pub(crate) display_prefix: String, |
| 570 | #[serde(default)] |
| 571 | pub(crate) scopes: Vec<String>, |
| 572 | #[serde(default)] |
| 573 | pub(crate) created_at: String, |
| 574 | #[serde(default)] |
| 575 | pub(crate) expires_at: Option<String>, |
| 576 | #[serde(default)] |
| 577 | pub(crate) last_used_at: Option<String>, |
| 578 | #[serde(default)] |
| 579 | pub(crate) revoked_at: Option<String>, |
| 580 | } |
| 581 | |
| 582 | /// Agent-model presence. The provider *identifier* only — a machine key can |
| 583 | /// cause the account's provider credential to be spent, never to be read back. |
| 584 | #[derive(Debug, Default, Deserialize)] |
| 585 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 586 | pub(crate) struct AgentState { |
| 587 | #[serde(default)] |
| 588 | pub(crate) configured: bool, |
| 589 | #[serde(default)] |
| 590 | pub(crate) model_provider: String, |
| 591 | #[serde(default)] |
| 592 | pub(crate) account_id: Option<String>, |
| 593 | } |
| 594 | |
| 595 | #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] |
| 596 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 597 | pub(crate) struct WhoamiResponse { |
| 598 | #[serde(default)] |
| 599 | pub(crate) account: MachineAccount, |
| 600 | #[serde(default)] |
| 601 | pub(crate) api_key: ApiKeyMetadata, |
| 602 | #[serde(default)] |
| 603 | pub(crate) agent: AgentState, |
| 604 | } |
| 605 | |
| 606 | #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] |
| 607 | pub(crate) struct AgentResponse { |
| 608 | #[serde(default)] |
| 609 | pub(crate) agent: AgentState, |
| 610 | } |
| 611 | |
| 612 | #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] |
| 613 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 614 | struct ApiKeyListResponse { |
| 615 | #[serde(default)] |
| 616 | api_keys: Vec<ApiKeyMetadata>, |
| 617 | } |
| 618 | |
| 619 | #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] |
| 620 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 621 | struct ApiKeyCreateResponse { |
| 622 | #[serde(default)] |
| 623 | api_key: ApiKeyMetadata, |
| 624 | #[serde(default)] |
| 625 | secret: String, |
| 626 | } |
| 627 | |
| 628 | #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)] |
| 629 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 630 | struct ApiKeyRevokeResponse { |
| 631 | #[serde(default)] |
| 632 | api_key: ApiKeyMetadata, |
| 633 | } |
| 634 | |
| 635 | #[derive(Debug, Serialize)] |
| 636 | #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")] |
| 637 | struct ApiKeyCreateRequest<'a> { |
| 638 | name: &'a str, |
| 639 | /// Absent means "never expires". Sent as absent, not null, so the body |
| 640 | /// stays inside the server's closed field set. |
| 641 | #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] |
| 642 | expires_in_days: Option<u32>, |
| 643 | #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")] |
| 644 | scopes: Option<Vec<String>>, |
| 645 | } |
| 646 | |
| 647 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 648 | // Machine client |
| 649 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 650 | |
| 651 | /// Read-only client authenticated by a machine token. |
| 652 | pub(crate) struct MachineClient<'a, T: CloudTransport> { |
| 653 | transport: &'a T, |
| 654 | key: MachineKey, |
| 655 | } |
| 656 | |
| 657 | impl<'a, T: CloudTransport> MachineClient<'a, T> { |
| 658 | pub(crate) fn new(transport: &'a T, key: MachineKey) -> Self { |
| 659 | Self { transport, key } |
| 660 | } |
| 661 | |
| 662 | /// The non-secret head of the key in use, for diagnostics. |
| 663 | #[must_use] |
| 664 | pub(crate) fn key_head(&self) -> &str { |
| 665 | self.key.head() |
| 666 | } |
| 667 | |
| 668 | /// `GET /api/account/api-key/whoami` — the diagnosis surface. |
| 669 | pub(crate) fn whoami(&self, sleeper: &mut dyn FnMut(Duration)) -> Result<WhoamiResponse> { |
| 670 | self.get_json("/api/account/api-key/whoami", sleeper) |
| 671 | } |
| 672 | |
| 673 | /// `GET /api/account/api-key/agent` — the precondition for machine work. |
| 674 | pub(crate) fn agent(&self, sleeper: &mut dyn FnMut(Duration)) -> Result<AgentResponse> { |
| 675 | self.get_json("/api/account/api-key/agent", sleeper) |
| 676 | } |
| 677 | |
| 678 | fn get_json<R: serde::de::DeserializeOwned>( |
| 679 | &self, |
| 680 | path: &str, |
| 681 | sleeper: &mut dyn FnMut(Duration), |
| 682 | ) -> Result<R> { |
| 683 | let response = send_with_retry(self.transport, Retry::Idempotent, sleeper, || { |
| 684 | CloudRequest { |
| 685 | method: HttpMethod::Get, |
| 686 | path: path.to_string(), |
| 687 | // Exactly one credential per request. The transport carries a |
| 688 | // single Authorization header, so a machine key and a session |
| 689 | // bearer cannot both be presented. |
| 690 | bearer: Some(self.key.expose()), |
| 691 | body: None, |
| 692 | } |
| 693 | })?; |
| 694 | decode_json(response) |
| 695 | } |
| 696 | } |
| 697 | |
| 698 | /// Issue a request, retrying only what is safe to replay. |
| 699 | fn send_with_retry<T: CloudTransport>( |
| 700 | transport: &T, |
| 701 | retry: Retry, |
| 702 | sleeper: &mut dyn FnMut(Duration), |
| 703 | build: impl Fn() -> CloudRequest, |
| 704 | ) -> Result<CloudResponse> { |
| 705 | let max_attempts = if retry == Retry::Idempotent { |
| 706 | MAX_ATTEMPTS |
| 707 | } else { |
| 708 | 1 |
| 709 | }; |
| 710 | let mut attempt = 1; |
| 711 | loop { |
| 712 | let (error, retry_after) = match transport.execute(build()) { |
| 713 | Ok(response) if (200..300).contains(&response.status) => return Ok(response), |
| 714 | Ok(response) => { |
| 715 | let retry_after = response.retry_after; |
| 716 | (classify(&response), retry_after) |
| 717 | } |
| 718 | Err(err) => ( |
| 719 | MachineError::transport(format!( |
| 720 | "Could not reach the Codewhale service: {}", |
| 721 | printable(&err.to_string()) |
| 722 | )), |
| 723 | None, |
| 724 | ), |
| 725 | }; |
| 726 | if !error.retryable || attempt >= max_attempts { |
| 727 | return Err(anyhow::Error::new(error)); |
| 728 | } |
| 729 | sleeper(backoff_delay(attempt, retry_after)); |
| 730 | attempt += 1; |
| 731 | } |
| 732 | } |
| 733 | |
| 734 | fn decode_json<R: serde::de::DeserializeOwned>(response: CloudResponse) -> Result<R> { |
| 735 | serde_json::from_slice(&response.body) |
| 736 | .context("The Codewhale service returned an invalid JSON response") |
| 737 | } |
| 738 | |
| 739 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 740 | // Management (interactive session only) |
| 741 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 742 | |
| 743 | /// `codewhale account api-keys …` — machine tokens. |
| 744 | /// |
| 745 | /// Deliberately a different noun from `codewhale account keys`, which manages |
| 746 | /// the BYOK provider vault. Those are opposite directions of trust: a provider |
| 747 | /// key is what Codewhale presents *to* DeepSeek, while a machine token is what |
| 748 | /// a customer presents *to* Codewhale. Merging them would let one typo revoke |
| 749 | /// the wrong credential. |
| 750 | #[derive(Debug, Args)] |
| 751 | pub(crate) struct ApiKeysArgs { |
| 752 | #[command(subcommand)] |
| 753 | command: ApiKeysCommand, |
| 754 | } |
| 755 | |
| 756 | #[derive(Debug, Subcommand)] |
| 757 | enum ApiKeysCommand { |
| 758 | /// Mint a machine token. The secret is printed once and never again. |
| 759 | Create(ApiKeyCreateArgs), |
| 760 | /// List this account's machine tokens. Metadata only; never the secret. |
| 761 | List, |
| 762 | /// Revoke a machine token by its 24-hex id. |
| 763 | Revoke { |
| 764 | /// The 24-hex key id, which is also the tail of the display prefix. |
| 765 | id: String, |
| 766 | }, |
| 767 | } |
| 768 | |
| 769 | #[derive(Debug, Args)] |
| 770 | pub(crate) struct ApiKeyCreateArgs { |
| 771 | /// Human label shown in listings and audit events. |
| 772 | #[arg(long)] |
| 773 | name: String, |
| 774 | /// Optional lifetime in days. Omit for a key that never expires. |
| 775 | #[arg(long = "expires-in-days", value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u32).range(1..=i64::from(MAX_EXPIRY_DAYS)))] |
| 776 | expires_in_days: Option<u32>, |
| 777 | /// Repeatable. Omit for all of `account:read`, `agent:run`, `models:infer`. |
| 778 | #[arg(long = "scope", value_name = "SCOPE")] |
| 779 | scopes: Vec<String>, |
| 780 | /// Also save the new secret as this machine's local `codewhale` provider |
| 781 | /// credential, so the CLI can immediately use Codewhale API models. |
| 782 | /// |
| 783 | /// The key never leaves this machine: it goes to the same secret store |
| 784 | /// `codewhale auth` writes, and nothing is uploaded anywhere. |
| 785 | #[arg(long = "use", default_value_t = false)] |
| 786 | use_locally: bool, |
| 787 | } |
| 788 | |
| 789 | /// `/^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9 ._:@\/-]{0,63}$/`, checked locally so a bad name |
| 790 | /// costs a message instead of a round trip. |
| 791 | pub(crate) fn validate_key_name(name: &str) -> Result<&str> { |
| 792 | let invalid = || { |
| 793 | anyhow!( |
| 794 | "API key name must be 1-{MAX_KEY_NAME_CHARS} characters, start with a letter or \ |
| 795 | digit, and contain only letters, digits, spaces, and `. _ : @ / -`." |
| 796 | ) |
| 797 | }; |
| 798 | let mut characters = name.chars(); |
| 799 | let Some(first) = characters.next() else { |
| 800 | return Err(invalid()); |
| 801 | }; |
| 802 | if !first.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || name.chars().count() > MAX_KEY_NAME_CHARS { |
| 803 | return Err(invalid()); |
| 804 | } |
| 805 | if characters.any(|character| { |
| 806 | !character.is_ascii_alphanumeric() |
| 807 | && !matches!(character, ' ' | '.' | '_' | ':' | '@' | '/' | '-') |
| 808 | }) { |
| 809 | return Err(invalid()); |
| 810 | } |
| 811 | Ok(name) |
| 812 | } |
| 813 | |
| 814 | /// Normalize `--scope` into the closed set. |
| 815 | /// |
| 816 | /// An omitted `--scope` means every scope, and is sent explicitly rather than |
| 817 | /// left to a server default: a key minted by this CLI should carry exactly the |
| 818 | /// scopes the CLI's own help promised, whatever the control plane's default is |
| 819 | /// this week. |
| 820 | pub(crate) fn validate_scopes(scopes: &[String]) -> Result<Option<Vec<String>>> { |
| 821 | if scopes.is_empty() { |
| 822 | return Ok(Some( |
| 823 | SCOPES.iter().map(|scope| (*scope).to_string()).collect(), |
| 824 | )); |
| 825 | } |
| 826 | let mut normalized = Vec::new(); |
| 827 | for scope in scopes { |
| 828 | let scope = scope.trim(); |
| 829 | if !SCOPES.contains(&scope) { |
| 830 | bail!( |
| 831 | "unknown scope `{}`; Codewhale API keys accept only {}", |
| 832 | printable(scope), |
| 833 | SCOPES.join(", ") |
| 834 | ); |
| 835 | } |
| 836 | if !normalized.iter().any(|existing| existing == scope) { |
| 837 | normalized.push(scope.to_string()); |
| 838 | } |
| 839 | } |
| 840 | Ok(Some(normalized)) |
| 841 | } |
| 842 | |
| 843 | /// The 24-hex key id, checked locally. |
| 844 | /// |
| 845 | /// This is a paste check, not an existence check: the server answers 404 |
| 846 | /// identically for a malformed id, an unknown id, and another account's id, so |
| 847 | /// nothing here can or should try to distinguish them. |
| 848 | pub(crate) fn validate_key_id(id: &str) -> Result<&str> { |
| 849 | let id = id.trim(); |
| 850 | if id.len() != KEY_ID_LEN |
| 851 | || !id |
| 852 | .bytes() |
| 853 | .all(|byte| byte.is_ascii_digit() || (b'a'..=b'f').contains(&byte)) |
| 854 | { |
| 855 | bail!( |
| 856 | "API key id must be {KEY_ID_LEN} lowercase hex characters — the part after `cwc_key_` \ |
| 857 | in the display prefix. Run `codewhale account api-keys list` to see them." |
| 858 | ); |
| 859 | } |
| 860 | Ok(id) |
| 861 | } |
| 862 | |
| 863 | /// Refuse a management command that would be authenticated by a machine key. |
| 864 | /// |
| 865 | /// The server would answer 403 `api_key_route_denied`, but a local refusal is |
| 866 | /// better: it never puts the credential on the wire, and it names the fix. |
| 867 | /// This is the load-bearing rule of the whole design — a stolen key must not |
| 868 | /// be able to bootstrap a successor that outlives the revocation of the key |
| 869 | /// that was stolen — so the CLI states it rather than discovering it. |
| 870 | pub(crate) fn reject_machine_key_for_management( |
| 871 | machine: &MachineKeyEnv, |
| 872 | has_session: bool, |
| 873 | ) -> Result<()> { |
| 874 | if machine.is_present() && !has_session { |
| 875 | bail!( |
| 876 | "Managing API keys needs an interactive login. Run `codewhale login`.\n\ |
| 877 | {MACHINE_KEY_ENV} is set, but a Codewhale API key deliberately cannot create, list, or \ |
| 878 | revoke keys — that is what stops a leaked key from minting a replacement for itself." |
| 879 | ); |
| 880 | } |
| 881 | Ok(()) |
| 882 | } |
| 883 | |
| 884 | /// Run `codewhale account api-keys …` against the interactive session. |
| 885 | pub(crate) fn run_api_keys<T: CloudTransport, W: Write>( |
| 886 | args: ApiKeysArgs, |
| 887 | client: &CloudClient<'_, T>, |
| 888 | machine: &MachineKeyEnv, |
| 889 | provider_secrets: &codewhale_secrets::Secrets, |
| 890 | out: &mut W, |
| 891 | sleeper: &mut dyn FnMut(Duration), |
| 892 | ) -> Result<()> { |
| 893 | reject_machine_key_for_management(machine, client.has_session()?)?; |
| 894 | match args.command { |
| 895 | ApiKeysCommand::Create(create) => { |
| 896 | let name = validate_key_name(create.name.trim())?; |
| 897 | let scopes = validate_scopes(&create.scopes)?; |
| 898 | let body = serde_json::to_vec(&ApiKeyCreateRequest { |
| 899 | name, |
| 900 | expires_in_days: create.expires_in_days, |
| 901 | scopes, |
| 902 | }) |
| 903 | .context("failed to encode the Codewhale API key request")?; |
| 904 | // `Retry::Never` is the whole point of the enum here: a POST that |
| 905 | // actually succeeded server-side would mint a second key whose |
| 906 | // one-time secret the caller never saw, and therefore can never |
| 907 | // revoke by id from the output they hold. |
| 908 | let response = client.execute_authenticated_with_retry( |
| 909 | HttpMethod::Post, |
| 910 | "/api/account/api-keys", |
| 911 | Some(body), |
| 912 | Retry::Never, |
| 913 | sleeper, |
| 914 | )?; |
| 915 | if !(200..300).contains(&response.status) { |
| 916 | return Err(anyhow::Error::new(classify(&response))); |
| 917 | } |
| 918 | let created: ApiKeyCreateResponse = decode_json(response)?; |
| 919 | write_created_key(out, &created)?; |
| 920 | if create.use_locally { |
| 921 | save_key_as_local_codewhale_credential(provider_secrets, &created.secret, out)?; |
| 922 | } |
| 923 | Ok(()) |
| 924 | } |
| 925 | ApiKeysCommand::List => { |
| 926 | let response = client.execute_authenticated_with_retry( |
| 927 | HttpMethod::Get, |
| 928 | "/api/account/api-keys", |
| 929 | None, |
| 930 | Retry::Idempotent, |
| 931 | sleeper, |
| 932 | )?; |
| 933 | if !(200..300).contains(&response.status) { |
| 934 | return Err(anyhow::Error::new(classify(&response))); |
| 935 | } |
| 936 | let listing: ApiKeyListResponse = decode_json(response)?; |
| 937 | write_key_listing(out, &listing.api_keys) |
| 938 | } |
| 939 | ApiKeysCommand::Revoke { id } => { |
| 940 | let id = validate_key_id(&id)?; |
| 941 | let path = format!("/api/account/api-keys/{id}"); |
| 942 | let response = client.execute_authenticated_with_retry( |
| 943 | HttpMethod::Delete, |
| 944 | &path, |
| 945 | None, |
| 946 | Retry::Idempotent, |
| 947 | sleeper, |
| 948 | )?; |
| 949 | if !(200..300).contains(&response.status) { |
| 950 | return Err(anyhow::Error::new(classify(&response))); |
| 951 | } |
| 952 | let revoked: ApiKeyRevokeResponse = decode_json(response)?; |
| 953 | writeln!( |
| 954 | out, |
| 955 | "Revoked Codewhale API key {}.", |
| 956 | printable(&revoked.api_key.id) |
| 957 | )?; |
| 958 | if let Some(revoked_at) = revoked.api_key.revoked_at.as_deref() { |
| 959 | writeln!(out, "Revoked at: {}", printable(revoked_at))?; |
| 960 | } |
| 961 | // Re-revoking returns the identical revokedAt, so a retried CI |
| 962 | // cleanup step is a no-op rather than a failure. Say so, because |
| 963 | // an operator who sees the same timestamp twice should not worry. |
| 964 | writeln!( |
| 965 | out, |
| 966 | "Revocation takes effect on the key's next request. Repeating this command is safe." |
| 967 | )?; |
| 968 | Ok(()) |
| 969 | } |
| 970 | } |
| 971 | } |
| 972 | |
| 973 | /// Print a freshly minted key. |
| 974 | /// |
| 975 | /// The secret goes to stdout exactly once, whether or not stdout is a TTY: CI |
| 976 | /// captures stdout, and a secret written to stderr would land in a diagnostics |
| 977 | /// stream that is far more likely to be archived and shared. |
| 978 | fn write_created_key<W: Write>(out: &mut W, created: &ApiKeyCreateResponse) -> Result<()> { |
| 979 | let metadata = &created.api_key; |
| 980 | writeln!( |
| 981 | out, |
| 982 | "Created Codewhale API key {}.", |
| 983 | printable(&metadata.id) |
| 984 | )?; |
| 985 | writeln!(out, "Name: {}", printable(&metadata.name))?; |
| 986 | writeln!(out, "Scopes: {}", printable(&metadata.scopes.join(", ")))?; |
| 987 | writeln!( |
| 988 | out, |
| 989 | "Expires: {}", |
| 990 | metadata |
| 991 | .expires_at |
| 992 | .as_deref() |
| 993 | .map_or_else(|| "never".to_string(), printable) |
| 994 | )?; |
| 995 | writeln!(out)?; |
| 996 | writeln!( |
| 997 | out, |
| 998 | "-- THIS IS THE ONLY TIME YOU WILL SEE THIS SECRET ------------------" |
| 999 | )?; |
| 1000 | writeln!(out, "{}", created.secret)?; |
| 1001 | writeln!( |
| 1002 | out, |
| 1003 | "-------------------------------------------------------------------" |
| 1004 | )?; |
| 1005 | writeln!( |
| 1006 | out, |
| 1007 | "Codewhale stores only a hash of it and cannot show it again. Copy it now into \ |
| 1008 | {MACHINE_KEY_ENV}. If you lose it, revoke this key and create another." |
| 1009 | )?; |
| 1010 | Ok(()) |
| 1011 | } |
| 1012 | |
| 1013 | /// Save a freshly minted key as this machine's local `codewhale` credential. |
| 1014 | /// |
| 1015 | /// `--use` is the one place a Codewhale API key is written to disk by this |
| 1016 | /// surface, and it writes only locally: the same secret store `codewhale auth` |
| 1017 | /// uses, under the `codewhale` provider's own slot. Nothing is uploaded, and |
| 1018 | /// no other provider's credential is touched. |
| 1019 | fn save_key_as_local_codewhale_credential<W: Write>( |
| 1020 | secrets: &codewhale_secrets::Secrets, |
| 1021 | secret: &str, |
| 1022 | out: &mut W, |
| 1023 | ) -> Result<()> { |
| 1024 | // Refuse to store a value this CLI would not accept as a key: a truncated |
| 1025 | // response is better caught here than as a 401 on the next model call. |
| 1026 | let key = MachineKey::parse(secret)?; |
| 1027 | let slot = ProviderKind::Codewhale.secret_store_slot(); |
| 1028 | secrets.set(slot, secret).map_err(|error| { |
| 1029 | anyhow!( |
| 1030 | "The key was created, but saving it to the local secret store ({slot}) failed: {error}. Copy the secret above into {MACHINE_KEY_ENV} instead." |
| 1031 | ) |
| 1032 | })?; |
| 1033 | writeln!(out)?; |
| 1034 | writeln!( |
| 1035 | out, |
| 1036 | "Saved {} as this machine's local `codewhale` provider credential.", |
| 1037 | key.head() |
| 1038 | )?; |
| 1039 | writeln!( |
| 1040 | out, |
| 1041 | "Select it with `codewhale config set provider codewhale`; models come from the account's own connected providers." |
| 1042 | )?; |
| 1043 | Ok(()) |
| 1044 | } |
| 1045 | |
| 1046 | fn write_key_listing<W: Write>(out: &mut W, keys: &[ApiKeyMetadata]) -> Result<()> { |
| 1047 | if keys.is_empty() { |
| 1048 | writeln!(out, "This Codewhale account has no API keys.")?; |
| 1049 | writeln!( |
| 1050 | out, |
| 1051 | "Create one with `codewhale account api-keys create --name <name>`." |
| 1052 | )?; |
| 1053 | return Ok(()); |
| 1054 | } |
| 1055 | for key in keys { |
| 1056 | // Revoked and expired keys stay listed so an owner can audit history. |
| 1057 | let state = if key.revoked_at.is_some() { |
| 1058 | "revoked" |
| 1059 | } else { |
| 1060 | "active" |
| 1061 | }; |
| 1062 | writeln!( |
| 1063 | out, |
| 1064 | "{} {} [{state}] scopes={}", |
| 1065 | printable(&key.id), |
| 1066 | printable(&key.name), |
| 1067 | printable(&key.scopes.join(",")) |
| 1068 | )?; |
| 1069 | writeln!(out, " prefix: {}", printable(&key.display_prefix))?; |
| 1070 | writeln!(out, " created: {}", printable(&key.created_at))?; |
| 1071 | writeln!( |
| 1072 | out, |
| 1073 | " expires: {}", |
| 1074 | key.expires_at |
| 1075 | .as_deref() |
| 1076 | .map_or_else(|| "never".to_string(), printable) |
| 1077 | )?; |
| 1078 | writeln!( |
| 1079 | out, |
| 1080 | " last used: {}", |
| 1081 | key.last_used_at |
| 1082 | .as_deref() |
| 1083 | .map_or_else(|| "never".to_string(), printable) |
| 1084 | )?; |
| 1085 | if let Some(revoked_at) = key.revoked_at.as_deref() { |
| 1086 | writeln!(out, " revoked: {}", printable(revoked_at))?; |
| 1087 | } |
| 1088 | } |
| 1089 | Ok(()) |
| 1090 | } |
| 1091 | |
| 1092 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1093 | // whoami / agent output |
| 1094 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1095 | |
| 1096 | /// Render a machine-key whoami. |
| 1097 | /// |
| 1098 | /// `agent.configured == false` arrives on a 200. Authentication succeeded, so |
| 1099 | /// this prints the account and then one distinct, actionable line — a |
| 1100 | /// diagnosis surface that failed on unrelated configuration would tell the |
| 1101 | /// operator nothing about the credential they came here to check. |
| 1102 | pub(crate) fn write_whoami<W: Write>( |
| 1103 | out: &mut W, |
| 1104 | who: &WhoamiResponse, |
| 1105 | api_base: &str, |
| 1106 | key_head: &str, |
| 1107 | ) -> Result<()> { |
| 1108 | writeln!(out, "Authenticated to Codewhale with an account API key.")?; |
| 1109 | writeln!(out, "Account ID: {}", printable(&who.account.id))?; |
| 1110 | if !who.account.display_name.trim().is_empty() { |
| 1111 | writeln!(out, "Name: {}", printable(&who.account.display_name))?; |
| 1112 | } |
| 1113 | if !who.account.email.trim().is_empty() { |
| 1114 | writeln!(out, "Email: {}", printable(&who.account.email))?; |
| 1115 | } |
| 1116 | if !who.account.region.trim().is_empty() { |
| 1117 | writeln!(out, "Region: {}", printable(&who.account.region))?; |
| 1118 | } |
| 1119 | if !who.account.plan.trim().is_empty() { |
| 1120 | writeln!(out, "Plan: {}", printable(&who.account.plan))?; |
| 1121 | } |
| 1122 | writeln!(out, "API: {api_base}")?; |
| 1123 | // The head is the whole key id, not a truncated fingerprint: it maps to |
| 1124 | // exactly one row in a listing, which is what makes revocation possible |
| 1125 | // from a build log. |
| 1126 | writeln!(out, "Key: {key_head} ({})", printable(&who.api_key.name))?; |
| 1127 | writeln!( |
| 1128 | out, |
| 1129 | "Key scopes: {}", |
| 1130 | printable(&who.api_key.scopes.join(", ")) |
| 1131 | )?; |
| 1132 | if let Some(expires_at) = who.api_key.expires_at.as_deref() { |
| 1133 | writeln!(out, "Key expires: {}", printable(expires_at))?; |
| 1134 | } |
| 1135 | if who.agent.configured { |
| 1136 | writeln!(out, "Agent model: {}", printable(&who.agent.model_provider))?; |
| 1137 | } else { |
| 1138 | writeln!( |
| 1139 | out, |
| 1140 | "Agent model: not configured — this key authenticates, but agent work will refuse \ |
| 1141 | until a model is chosen in the Codewhale app or with `codewhale account keys set <provider>`." |
| 1142 | )?; |
| 1143 | } |
| 1144 | Ok(()) |
| 1145 | } |
| 1146 | |
| 1147 | /// Render the agent precondition. |
| 1148 | pub(crate) fn write_agent<W: Write>(out: &mut W, agent: &AgentState) -> Result<()> { |
| 1149 | writeln!( |
| 1150 | out, |
| 1151 | "Codewhale agent model: {}", |
| 1152 | printable(&agent.model_provider) |
| 1153 | )?; |
| 1154 | if let Some(account_id) = agent.account_id.as_deref() { |
| 1155 | writeln!(out, "Account ID: {}", printable(account_id))?; |
| 1156 | } |
| 1157 | writeln!(out, "This account is ready to run machine work.")?; |
| 1158 | Ok(()) |
| 1159 | } |
| 1160 | |
| 1161 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1162 | // Review wiring |
| 1163 | // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1164 | |
| 1165 | /// Map the account's configured provider identifier onto a local route. |
| 1166 | /// |
| 1167 | /// `codewhale review` hard-errors when a model resolves to several configured |
| 1168 | /// routes. When CI authenticates with a machine key the account has already |
| 1169 | /// answered that question, so the account's own provider is the disambiguator |
| 1170 | /// — no new flag, and no guess. |
| 1171 | pub(crate) fn review_provider_from_agent(agent: &AgentState) -> Result<ProviderKind> { |
| 1172 | if !agent.configured { |
| 1173 | return Err(anyhow::Error::new(MachineError::new( |
| 1174 | 409, |
| 1175 | "account_agent_model_unconfigured", |
| 1176 | "This Codewhale account has no agent model configured. Choose one in the Codewhale \ |
| 1177 | app, or run `codewhale account keys set <provider>`.", |
| 1178 | EXIT_AGENT_UNCONFIGURED, |
| 1179 | ))); |
| 1180 | } |
| 1181 | let provider = agent.model_provider.trim(); |
| 1182 | parse_route_kind(provider).ok_or_else(|| { |
| 1183 | anyhow!( |
| 1184 | "This Codewhale account is configured for agent provider `{}`, which this CLI build \ |
| 1185 | does not know. Upgrade `codewhale`, or choose a supported provider in the Codewhale app.", |
| 1186 | printable(provider) |
| 1187 | ) |
| 1188 | }) |
| 1189 | } |
| 1190 | |
| 1191 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 1192 | mod tests; |
| 1193 |