| 1 | import type { DocsSandboxDict } from "../types"; |
| 2 | |
| 3 | /** |
| 4 | * English reference dictionary for `app/[locale]/docs/sandbox/page.tsx`. |
| 5 | * Copy moved verbatim from the page's `isZh` ternaries — any wording change |
| 6 | * belongs in its own commit, never mixed into a structural move. |
| 7 | */ |
| 8 | export const docsSandbox: DocsSandboxDict = { |
| 9 | metaTitle: "Sandbox & Approval · Codewhale Docs", |
| 10 | metaDescription: |
| 11 | "The honest boundary: macOS Seatbelt, opt-in Linux bubblewrap, platform gaps, and approval policy.", |
| 12 | bodyClassName: "text-ink-soft leading-relaxed", |
| 13 | overviewTitle: "Sandbox & Approval", |
| 14 | overviewLead: |
| 15 | "Codewhale can launch shell commands proposed by a model. Approval policy, workspace-aware tools, and an operating-system command wrapper are separate controls: an approval is not a sandbox, and selecting workspace-write does not prove the current platform has an OS wrapper available. This page describes only behavior wired into the command execution path.", |
| 16 | platforms: [ |
| 17 | [ |
| 18 | "macOS · Seatbelt", |
| 19 | "Codewhale probes /usr/bin/sandbox-exec; when the probe succeeds and the policy requests a sandbox, the child command is wrapped in a generated Seatbelt profile: broad filesystem reads, policy-limited writes, and network only when the policy enables it. A failed probe is reported honestly as no OS sandbox.", |
| 20 | ], |
| 21 | [ |
| 22 | "Linux · opt-in bubblewrap", |
| 23 | "Linux command sandboxing is opt-in: set prefer_bwrap = true and keep /usr/bin/bwrap executable. The child gets a read-only root view with writable mounts derived from the resolved policy; the network namespace is isolated by default and --share-net is added only when the policy enables network access. Without the opt-in, Codewhale reports none.", |
| 24 | ], |
| 25 | [ |
| 26 | "Windows · no OS sandbox", |
| 27 | "The Windows command path currently reports no OS sandbox. Host permissions and approval policy still apply, but they are not a Codewhale OS command sandbox.", |
| 28 | ], |
| 29 | [ |
| 30 | "External OpenSandbox execution", |
| 31 | 'With sandbox_backend = "opensandbox", shell execution is sent to the configured OpenSandbox-compatible HTTP endpoint instead of starting a local child. Isolation guarantees belong to the configured service and its operator.', |
| 32 | ], |
| 33 | ], |
| 34 | policiesTitle: "Policies and fallbacks", |
| 35 | policiesLead: |
| 36 | "The local {sandboxMode} values are {readOnly}, {workspaceWrite}, {dangerFullAccess}, and {externalSandbox}. The first two are enforced by Seatbelt or bubblewrap only when that wrapper is selected and available; {dangerFullAccess} deliberately bypasses the local OS wrapper; {externalSandbox} declares that execution is already externally isolated. When no wrapper is selected, the shell command runs without Codewhale OS isolation — approval rules and workspace-aware native file tools remain separate controls.", |
| 37 | diagnosticsTitle: "Diagnostics and limits", |
| 38 | diagnosticsLead: |
| 39 | "codewhale setup --status, codewhale doctor, codewhale doctor --json, and the diagnostics tool report the locally available wrapper after applying the resolved bubblewrap preference. Denial attribution is intentionally conservative: a child command's generic Permission denied is not by itself proof that Codewhale's sandbox blocked it, and unsandboxed command failures are never labeled sandbox denials.", |
| 40 | diagnosticsLimits: |
| 41 | "The limitations are stated just as plainly: availability is checked before launch, yet the selected wrapper can still fail because of host policy, container restrictions, or a race after the probe; bubblewrap ignores a configured writable root that is missing or not a directory; and no sandbox protects against kernel vulnerabilities or all resource-exhaustion and side-channel attacks.", |
| 42 | sourceNote: "Source document: docs/SANDBOX.md · Update docs-map.ts when changing.", |
| 43 | }; |
| 44 |